The Journal of Israeli History
Vol. 24, No. 2, September 2005, pp. 183-202

The Historiography of the 1948 War in Palestine: The Missing Dimension - David Tal

While the "New Historians" of the 1948 Palestine War have deepened our understanding of those events, they have primarily been interested in its diplomatic history. What is still missing is a thoroughly documented military history of the war, which can help us treat the war as a war, and not as a political or ideological event, and thus address issues that have so far been neglected. This article shows how such a history can illumine the diplomatic and political aspects of the war through the study of three test cases: the Israeli-Jordanian fighting, which reveals that the two armies came into combat only because of mutual misperceptions and a lack of channels of communication; the Palestinians' success in inflicting severe blows on the Haganah in late March 1948, which points to the role of the Haganah's strategy in its failure; and the story of the unsuccessful Israeli attack on the Egyptian forces at Isdud on the night of 2/3 June 1948, which sheds new light on the meaning and nature of the Jewish victory in the war.

The historiography of the 1948 Palestine War became a source of controversy following the publication of Benny Morris's article in Tikkun in 1988, in which he claimed that a new kind of historian had emerged who, unlike the old historians, was not committed to the old Zionist story and was ready and able to tell the true story of the 1948 war in Palestine.1 Now that the dust created by the subsequent debate has settled, and Morris himself has since adopted a rather different position, it is time to take another look at the historiography of the 1948 Palestine war, to see what is new, and what is still missing. The emergence of the New History signaled above all the entry of the historiography of the 1948 war into its "archival" phase. After 30 years, historians were given access to the documents pertinent to the 1948 war deposited in the relevant Israeli archives and the British Public Record Office. It is hence hardly surprising that the first studies of the new historians that were based on archival sources, such as those of Ilan Pappe´, Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim, were published during the second half of the 1980s, and this trend has been growing ever since. Earlier studies, like those of Nethanel Lorch and Elhanan Oren, were also based on archival sources, but these were exclusively Israeli documents that strongly reflected the authors' affiliation to the Israeli security establishment.2

Hence, the major contribution of the new historians lay in bringing the 1948 war historiography to its archival stage, which allowed them to deepen our understanding of the war in a way that had previously been impossible. However, the new historians were primarily interested in the war's diplomatic history. Military historians such as Trevor Dupuy, Chaim Herzog, Martin van Creveld and Ahron Bregman did explore the military dimension of the war, but as they relied mainly on secondary, mostly Israeli, sources and not on archival documents, their work is far from complete.3

Hence, the full military history of the war still remains to be written. Examining the course of the war from the perspective of military history can also deepen our understanding of events and developments that works of diplomatic history have failed to explore. One example is the Israeli-Jordanian war. As will be seen, a careful study of the Israeli-Jordanian fighting reveals that the two armies had no reason to fight, and it was only because of misperceptions and a lack of channels of communication that the two armies came into combat. It is precisely the military, rather than the diplomatic, history of the war that can shed light on such developments.

Examining this missing dimension in the historiography of the war can also help us treat the war as a war, and not as a political or ideological event, and thus to address issues that have so far been neglected. One example is the Palestinians' success in inflicting severe blows on the Haganah in late March 1948, when their forces destroyed five Haganah convoys in various parts of the country and placed Jerusalem under siege. As we will see, the research has concentrated on the Haganah's reaction to the crisis, and not on the way the Palestinians succeeded in turning the tide of war. What enabled the Palestinians to achieve such unprecedented successes? Did the Haganah's strategy play a role in its failure? Similarly, the story of the unsuccessful Israeli attack on the Egyptian forces on the night of June 2/3 is also revealing, mainly because of the gap between the way the battle and its consequences are presented and its real significance. The story of the Isdud battle can thus shed new light on the meaning and nature of the Jewish victory in the war.

The War on the Roads: The Turning Point in the Jewish - Palestinian War

After four months of fighting, during which the Palestinians had tried in vain to win control over Palestine's roads and to cut off Jewish settlements throughout the country, especially Jerusalem, a change occurred at the end of March 1948 when they succeeded in destroying five Haganah convoys within one week. Indeed, the Palestinians now seemed to be winning the "War on the Roads," whose high point was their success in cutting off the Jerusalem-Jaffa road and laying siege to Jerusalem. Nonetheless, all David Ben-Gurion had to say of these successes was that "the Arabs closed the [Jerusalem-Jaffa] road," while both "old" and "new" historians have treated the issue in a similarly cursory manner.4 Nor has there been any serious attempt to analyze the Jews' response to the crisis and how they overcame it. An understanding of what really happened during this last week of March 1948 necessitates a comprehensive scrutiny of the Jewish strategic position, the decision-making process in the Palestinian camp, the inter-Arab politics of Haj Amin al-Husayni, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and the military developments before, during, and after that week.

Two determining factors underlay the Palestinians' response to the United Nations Partition Resolution. The first was their inability to conduct their struggle against the resolution, which they completely rejected, on their own, and their overwhelming dependence on the assistance of the Arab states. The second was the Arab governments' refusal to let the Palestinians fight their own war. The Arab leaders, particularly in Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, were unwilling to allow al-Husayni to lead the struggle for Palestine. In late 1947 the Arab League's political committee established a military committee, consisting of representatives from all the Arab League's states, under the command of Iraqi General Ismail Safwat. Safwat was put in command of both the Palestinian military groups in Palestine and the Arab Liberation Army, set up by the League in December 1947.5 The ex-Mufti was fighting two wars: one against the Jews and one against the Arab League, which could be seen as usurping the conduct of the war from the Palestinians. He invested much effort in the attempt to install his nephew, Abed al-Qadir al-Husayni, as commander of the forces fighting in Palestine, instead of Safwat, but failed. This state of affairs created a duality that hampered the Palestinian conduct of war, since the arms contributed by the Arab states to the Palestine war according to the Arab League's decision were given to Safwat, who was responsible for distributing them. Another conflict was created by the ex-Mufti's attempts to establish his control within Palestine by nominating his prote´ge´s to commanding positions in Palestine, in defiance of Safwat's claim that he was the only one to authorize such nominations.6 Thus, while in some places men loyal to the ex- Mufti were in control of military affairs, in other places Safwat's Military Committee gained control by installing foreign commanders, who came with volunteers sponsored by the Arab League.7 The latter phenomenon became increasingly frequent as time elapsed. Thus the Palestinians entered the crucial stage in the struggle for Palestine internally divided and without influence in the inter-Arab and international arenas.8

The Palestinians were unable to overcome their initial weakness and lack of sufficient trained and committed fighters. They also had no central command to run the war, mainly because the Arab League sought to take control of the war. Hence, despite the Palestinians' attacks, Jewish convoys traveled to and from Jerusalem almost on a daily basis until late March 1948.9 To make the campaign possible and effective, the Palestinians needed to establish at least some form of central command, in which both the Palestinians and the volunteer guerrillas would take part. They also needed to and his two senior commanders traveled to Damascus in early February to meet the Syrian president. At this meeting the argument over the division of power in Palestine was settled: it was agreed to establish four command-areas in Palestine: east, west, north and south, each area commander to be nominally subordinated to Safwat. The northern area commander would be the Syrian Fawz al-Din al-Qawukji, who was at that time an instructor at the Iraqi military academy, the eastern area commander would be Abed al-Qadir al-Husayni, and the commander of the western sector, Hassan Salame-both Haj al-Amin al-Husayni men.10 One result of the agreement was that while unorganized Palestinian attacks against Jews continued, more and more components of the Palestinian struggle came under some form of central command, even if loose and preliminary. The reorganization and reinforcement of the Palestinian camp with trained Palestinians and volunteers enabled the successes of the Palestinians' March campaign.11

It was also agreed in Damascus that the ex-Mufti would receive financial assistance which would allow him to pay the wages of local and foreign "volunteers," while Abed al-Qadir al-Husayni and Hassan Salame reportedly received a monthly payment of 500 Palestine liras each.12 Haj Amin and his commanders thus returned at the head of groups of "volunteers" who had undergone military training, which provided them with capabilities hitherto unseen among the Palestinians. British police reported that the trainees' "discipline and tactics were far in advance of anything yet encountered."13

Upon their return to Palestine the ex-Mufti instructed Salame and Abed al-Qadir to carry out a major campaign aimed at stopping Jewish traffic on the roads, and in particular the road to Jerusalem,14 and during March the tide of the fighting changed. In what seemed to be a coordinated Palestinian campaign on a national scale, over 100 Haganah men were killed in one week while escorting five convoys that were intercepted by the Palestinians: at Atarot (14), Hartuv (11), Nebi Daniel (12), Yehiam (46), and Hulda (24). To these casualties should be added the loss in equipment, arms, and vehicles.15 Palestinian successes were the result of their ability to act in an orchestrated manner, exploiting to the utmost Palestinian advantages and Jewish shortcomings. The reinforcement of the Palestinian camp by trained guerrillas and the effective use of the Paza'a system-by which local villagers were mustered at a certain time to await the arrival of a convoy, and which enabled the Palestinian leaders to gather together hundreds of rifle-holders for several hours-all bore results.16

The Haganah was surprised by the success of the Palestinians' concerted campaign, even though there had been many indications that this phase was imminent. Reports about the planned campaign had appeared in the Arab press,17 and numerous intelligence reports had accumulated in the Haganah files about the Palestinians' intention to intensify their struggle over the roads and to mount a massive campaign to halt Jewish transportation, mainly to isolated locations, first and foremost Jerusalem.18 Despite the unhindered flow of information from the Haganah intelligence branch to the field units, Haganah deployment did not change, and the convoys did not change their routes.

For the Jews, the most worrying aspect of the Palestinians' campaign was their success in cutting off Jerusalem from the coastal plain. This was indeed a significant achievement. However, the convoy crisis was not only a problem, it was also a symptom, indicating that the strategic plan that dictated the Jews' moves-the May 1946 Plan ("Plan C")-was no longer adequate either in its underlying assumptions or in its resultant mode of operation. This plan was based on the assumption that any military conflict between the Jewish and Arab communities would be similar to hostilities that had erupted while the British were still in the country. While acknowledging that the Arabs would be better equipped and organized, it nonetheless envisaged that they would confine themselves to perpetrating local terror acts against industrial and economic targets. The Haganah's reaction, according to the plan, should be to protect those targets and take measures to quell the terror campaign. The counter-measures would be restricted to retaliation attacks against political leaders ("personal terror"), public sites, vital Arab economic and industrial facilities, and so forth.19 This was essentially a defensive plan that set no offensive missions or goals for the Haganah. Nothing was said about the possibility of seizing territory held by the Arabs, for example, not to mention a full-scale assault against the Palestinian community or the takeover of the country. Jewish reaction to the outbreak of the hostilities in December 1947 was the implementation of the May 1946 Plan. The leadership of the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) had assumed that the Palestinians would eventually accept the UN resolution, that a sharp and decisive yet local response to Arab attacks would prevent escalation, and the riots would subside.20 Haganah intelligence experts claimed that since the majority of Palestinians had not joined in the fighting, nothing should be done to provoke them. This cautionary note was widely accepted by the Yishuv military and political leadership.21

Until the March crisis, the Haganah successfully countered the Palestinians' challenge, but the improvements in the Palestinians' organization, structure, training, and arms enabled them to fully exploit their geographical dispersion and to gain advantage over the Jews in the War on the Roads. Nonetheless, the May 1946 plan was another factor that eventually worked to the Palestinians' advantage. Its defensive strategy of reaction led to the dispersion of Haganah forces throughout the country, which was able to prevent the fall of Jewish settlements but no longer sufficed for withstanding the Palestinians' orchestrated campaign. It thus became obvious that the convoy system was no longer adequate.22

The conceptual basis of the May 1946 Plan also seemed to have lost its validity. By March 1948 it was obvious that the Palestinians would not accept the Partition Resolution, and the attempts to quell the Palestinian resistance through painful strikes had failed. Given this situation, the approaching end of the British Mandate and subsequent declaration of Jewish independence, which would probably be followed by the invasion of the Arab armies, gave a whole new meaning to the Palestinian challenge. It was only natural to link the hostile activities of the Palestinians, mainly those living inside the designated state of Israel, to the external threat to the Jewish state presented by the invading Arab armies. In order to address this challenge, the Haganah Command issued Plan Dalet ("D") in March 1948. Although the meaning and implications of this plan are beyond the scope of the current discussion, it is important to note that its working assumption was that the Haganah should make it possible to establish a Jewish state in accordance with the UN resolution, and secure its existence against hostile forces. According to Plan Dalet, the Haganah brigades were to launch offensive campaigns with the goal of seizing territory and assuming Jewish control over the territory allocated to the Jewish state by the United Nations. Hence, when the Haganah assembled its much better equipped and trained troops and turned to a strategy that was based on seizure of territory, the Palestinians proved to be no match. As soon as the Jews took the offensive the Palestinians had no chance, and during April and May they lost garrison after garrison. The Jewish-Palestinian war was decided in those months. The Palestinian defeat was complete, and it was followed by the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel and the Arab armies' invasion of Palestine.

The (Superflous?) Israeli -Jordanian Fighting

At first sight the Israeli-Jordanian fighting seems to have been superfluous-not because of the collusion theory, according to which Jordan's King Abdullah and the Zionist leaders conspired to divide Palestine among them, at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs,23 but because the two sides had nothing to fight about. The one point of friction was the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem's Old City, but even that could not be counted as a reason for fighting. All that Abdullah wanted was to occupy the area to the west of his kingdom that had been allocated by the United Nations to be part of the Arab-Palestinian state, an area that the Jews had no intention of acquiring, while the Jews wanted to make the Jewish part of Jerusalem part of their state, even though the United Nations had decided that that area would be internationalized. It seems that the two sides fought so fiercely, with intervals, from May to July 1948 simply because each side had no idea what the other side's intentions were and consequently acted to frustrate what it assumed was the other side's plan.

Abdullah's attitude towards the Jewish-Arab conflict in general, and the prospect of Jewish and Arab-Palestinian states in Palestine in particular, was influenced by his vision of Greater Syria. Since his forced expulsion from Syria and his assumption in 1922 of the throne of the Emirate of Transjordan (which in May 1946 became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), Abdullah had nurtured hopes of widening his tiny fiefdom to include Syria and Palestine. Of these two, the possibility of swallowing Palestine was more plausible, and with the advent of the political process toward the end of the British Mandate and the introduction of an alternative solution in Palestine, Abdullah acted to make his dream come true. However, fearing that a unilateral act on his part would provoke Arab rage against him, even to the point of Jordan's expulsion from the Arab League, he sought ways to legitimize his Palestine campaign. To that end he tried to gain support amongst the Palestinians, in order to justify his control over the Palestinian territory, and he also sought the participation of other Arab states in the Palestine campaign, although not within the framework of the unified Arab League's command and aims.24

That command was created in April 1948, led by Iraqi General Mahmud Nur a-Din. In early May the Arab chiefs of staffs or their representatives met in Damascus to assign each army its missions, according to a unified plan prepared by Nur a-Din. The focus of his plan was to be northeastern Palestine, where the invading forces would try to sever the eastern Galilee, from the Huleh Valley to Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee), from the territory of the Jewish state. This was to be achieved through the advance of the Syrian and Lebanese forces from the Bint Jubayl area in Lebanon through Malkiya towards Safed, Tiberias and Nazareth; Iraqi and Jordanian units would push westward towards Afula and Nazareth and await the next stage; and the Egyptian army would move northward, to Yibna (over 30 km. south of Tel Aviv), which was inside the designated Arab state, in order to "pin down and destroy Jewish forces and thereby aid the success of the [northern] operations." The Egyptians were not to advance automatically into the territory of the Jewish state but, at least in the first stage, to create a diversion and lure Jewish forces into their sector, thus removing pressure from the north, where the Arabs would make their main push.25

The unified campaign idea did not materialize, as King Abdullah made his own plans for the Palestine campaign, which emasculated the unified command plan and made it meaningless. According to Abdullah's plan, the Arab Legion would carry out operations in the central area of Arab Palestine. It would cross the Jordan River after 15 May and advance towards Beer Sheva, Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, and Jenin, with forward elements in Tul Karem and the area just south of Lydda-all within the area allocated to the Arab Palestinians.26 What is missing from this description of Transjordan's war aims is Jerusalem. The available sources indicate that initially there was no intention of sending the Legion to Jerusalem. Moreover, British Minister in Amman Alan Kirkbride described Abdullah's great distress at the reports on the dire situation of the Palestinians in Jerusalem. It was only after receiving the reports, along with phone calls and delegations from Palestinians that Abdullah instructed his army to move into Jerusalem.27

Even at this late stage, there seemed to be a slight chance that an Israeli-Jordanian war could be prevented. On 11 May Abdullah met with Golda Meyerson (Meir) of the Jewish Agency for the second time (the first meeting had been in November 1947). This time their meeting was tainted by the events of the preceding month: the massacre of Arab villagers at Deir Yassin, the total collapse of the Palestinians in the face of the Jewish offensive and the ensuing massive flight of Palestinians, mainly to Jordan. All these developments stiffened Abdullah's attitude, and Meyerson indeed found him sounding tougher than before. The discussion, he said, should proceed from the assumption that one state would be established in Palestine, with the Jews to be granted autonomy in the areas where they had a majority, and the country to be annexed to Jordan after one year. Meyerson rejected this out of hand, to which the king retorted that "he had been in favor of peace all along, but the only way to avert a war is to accept his proposal."28 The conversation was doomed from the outset.

While Abdullah was in no position to make meaningful gestures to the Jews, he was well aware that the Jews would not accept his statement that "the only solution to the Palestine problem was an Arab state which included areas over which the Jews exercised local autonomy." In fact, he had told Kirkbride that "he did not expect the Jews to accept the proposal," and he knew that "the Jews reacted sharply" to the public statement he had recently made to that effect.29 However, he wanted the meeting with Meyerson as he wished "to keep the door open for negotiations when both sides were in a more reasonable frame of mind."30 Furthermore, given the Arab Legion's limited goals and its intention to refrain from invading territory allocated to the Jewish state, war between the two armies was not unavoidable. This was the gist of the talks on 2 May between representatives of the Haganah and a Jordanian delegation headed by Colonel Goldie, assistant to John Glubb, the Arab Legion commander, at which Goldie claimed that the Arab Legion "[did] not desire to fight" the Jews.31

After hearing Meyerson's account of the 11 May meeting, Ben-Gurion ordered the Haganah high command "to plan a campaign against a general Arab invasion" and "to issue an order to the brigades about an expected invasion by Transjordan." He consulted with his senior advisers on whether to attack the Jordanian forces the moment they crossed the Jordan River or to wait until they entered territory allocated to the Jewish state.32 As far as Israel was concerned, then, the Arab Legion was poised to join the invasion of the Jewish state. Shertok indeed acknowledged that Abdullah intended to take over only the Arab parts of Palestine, but as Shertok told the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, "we were by no means certain whether all these assurances could be taken on their face value."33 Israel's deployment in the country's central sectors reflected that assessment. Four Haganah brigades were stationed in May 1948 opposite the Jordanian front, more troops than in any other sector, even though numerically the Arab Legion was smaller than the Egyptian contingent, for example.34

The Jewish-Jordanian war "officially" started only after the termination of the British Mandate and Ben-Gurion's declaration of the establishment of a Jewish state on 14 May. On that night the Legion's forces, some of which had just left Palestine, crossed the Jordan River on their way westward.35 After crossing into Palestine over the Allenby Bridge, the troops turned north, instead of west to Jerusalem, and went to Nablus via a third-grade road, and from there to Ramallah. The reason for the diversion was Glubb's reluctance to engage the Jewish forces in Jerusalem.36 Since the Legion's aim was the major cities of Samaria and Judea, the Jordanian troops advanced and positioned themselves there.37 The Jordanians' takeover of the parts west of the River Jordan that had been allocated to the Palestinians was completed on 20 May, with the appointment of Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, a former prime minister, as military governor of all parts of Palestine occupied by the Arab Legion, who appointed deputies in the main cities in the occupied territories.38

While drawing up the invasion plans, Glubb's attitude to Jerusalem had been mixed. On the one hand, he wanted to avoid fighting in Jerusalem. He was afraid that urban warfare in Jerusalem against the Jews would lead to many casualties among his troops, who, unlike the Jews, had no experience of such fighting. Defeat in Jerusalem, Glubb feared, could lead to the loss of the positions the Arab Legion already held in Samaria, Judea and the Hebron area. On the other hand, if the Jews succeeded in holding all of Jerusalem, they would gain free passage to Jericho, which might expose the Arab Legion on the West Bank to the danger of being cut off from its bases in Jordan. Glubb believed that the best solution would be a cease-fire in Jerusalem, which was being negotiated at that time and which would maintain the existing status quo. It would give advantage to neither side and would not jeopardize the Arab Legion's position.39

The Iraqi military governor of Arab Jerusalem, Fadil Bey, was inclined to accept a cease-fire, but he referred the matter to King Abdullah.40 On 15 May, talks were conducted between Arab representatives on the one hand, and the Security Council Truce Commission, the High Commissioner and the Chief Secretary for Palestine on other hand, resulting in an agreement on a cease-fire in Jerusalem. However, the agreement did not come into effect as immediately upon the termination of the Mandate, the Jews launched Operation "Kilshon" (Trident), whose goal was to impose Jewish control over the western part of the city, where Arab enclaves separated Jewish neighborhoods from one another.41

The Jews' offensive in Jerusalem put the Arabs of Jerusalem in a dire situation, and Amman was deluged with desperate pleas for help, by telephone and from delegations to the King's palace. Abdullah was unable to ignore the outcry. Glubb tried to postpone a decision on this matter in an attempt to avoid fighting in Jerusalem. The Jordanian government was so disturbed by his delaying tactics that the Jordanian prime minister checked with Kirkbride to find out whether the British government had ordered Glubb not to go to Jerusalem or whether he was acting on his own initiative. In an attempt to avoid clashes with the Jews, Glubb decided to limit the Legion's operation to the occupation of the Old City and the Arab part of Jerusalem, and to avoid occupying all of Jerusalem, so that King Abdullah could become the savior of the Holy Places without risking an all-out war with the Jews. The Jordanians also assumed that operating in Jerusalem would not be considered a violation of Abdullah's commitment not to invade the Jewish state, as Jerusalem and its approaches were beyond the boundaries of the State of Israel.42 In any case, with the change in plans, the Arab Legion did not intend to do more than protect the Old City, and its subsequent attacks were also designed to serve this purpose.43

The controversy over sending the Legion to Jerusalem ended on 17 May when King Abdullah personally ordered Major Abdullah al-Tal, the 6th Battalion commander, to send forces to the Old City's rescue. Al-Tal immediately sent three of his battalion's companies, and upon his arrival in Jerusalem on the following day, he himself took command of the Arab forces in the city.44 This reinforcement sealed the Jewish Quarter's fate, and after a few days of heavy fighting, al-Tal delivered an ultimatum through the Red Cross representative, demanding the Quarter's surrender. The ultimatum fell on receptive ears. Despite the urgings of David Shaltiel, commander of the 4th Brigade, to the forces and residents of the Jewish Quarter to continue the struggle, on the next day the Quarter surrendered.45

For the Jordanians, the war was now over. They had achieved all their goals, both those planned beforehand-the occupation of the West Bank-and those set after the invasion to Palestine-the occupation of Jerusalem's Old City. However, the war did not end here because the Israelis had no idea of the Arab Legion's limited goals. All they knew was what they saw, and from the Israeli side it seemed as if the Jordanians were conducting a concerted campaign aimed at capturing all of Jerusalem in order to sever it from the Jewish state. The events in the Old City and north Jerusalem certainly seemed to be proof of this, as were the events to the south of Jerusalem, where Ramat Rachel came under heavy attack and was conquered.46 Ben-Gurion became convinced that it was most urgent to launch a forceful offensive against the Legion. However, to make such a campaign effective it was first necessary to clear the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road by destroying Ramle and Lydda and capturing Latrun from the Arab Liberation Army forces that had held it until 14 May (he did not yet know that the Arab Legion had already taken their place), after which he intended to send heavy reinforcements to Jerusalem. Until then, a cease-fire was the only way to relieve the pressure from Jerusalem.47 Yadin and other senior military men agreed with Ben-Gurion that a cease-fire in Jerusalem was desirable, but for different reasons. Unlike Ben-Gurion, IDF Chief of Operations General Yigael Yadin opposed investing great efforts and forces in the struggle over the road to Jerusalem, and he did so only under heavy pressure from Ben-Gurion. He thought that a cease-fire in Jerusalem might assuage Ben-Gurion's fears and bring him to agree to the different strategy proposed by Yadin.48 However, a cease-fire proved unattainable, as with the Arab Legion's success in gaining control over east and north Jerusalem, the Jordanians lost interest in a cease- fire, seeking to strengthen their hold in the Arab part of the city and in the Old City.49

The Latrun garrison on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road had been held by Qawukji's forces, but they withdrew in accordance with an earlier agreement with King Abdullah that upon the Arab Legion's invasion of Palestine they would concentrate north of Ramallah "for a week's recuperation," after which the Arab Liberation Army would act in concert with the Arab Legion. Jewish intelligence intercepted a message sent from the Legion's HQ in Amman to Qawukji, in which the latter was instructed to pull his forces out of Palestine to Transjordan, after the League's invasion.50 The Jordanian forces in Palestine were unaware of this order, so that Qawukji's abandonment of the garrison came as a surprise to the Arab Legion's commanders. It took the Legion three days to man the strategic place, a critical period which, fortunately for the Jordanians, went unnoticed by the Jews.51 It seems that the Arab Legion had not planned to go to Latrun. After arriving in Ramallah, the Jordanian 3rd Brigade seized positions along the Ramallah-Latrun road. While positioning itself, a battalion's command noticed that units of the Liberation Army were leaving the Latrun garrison. The move surprised the Jordanians, but even though they were afraid that the Jews would capture the vacant garrison, the battalion was not allowed to make any further moves.52

Instructions to capture Latrun arrived on 17 May. The Arab Legion was preparing its offensive against Jerusalem, and the Jordanian Brigade commander sent forces to the garrison to prevent the Jews from bringing reinforcements to the city.53

Once fighting broke out in Jerusalem between the Jewish and the Jordanian forces, Latrun became the crucial point for both sides. The Jews needed Latrun as it dominated the road to Jerusalem, vital for sending reinforcements to the Jewish forces in the city to enable them to thwart what they believed to be the Jordanian attempts to capture the entire city. The Jordanians needed Latrun to prevent those reinforcements from reaching Jerusalem and enabling what they believed to be the Jews' plans to attack the Jordanian stronghold in Jerusalem and its vicinity. But neither side had the intentions attributed to it by the other. For this reason, the war between Jordan and Israel in 1948 was the result of misconception and misunderstanding. This, however, was also why it was the first front that moved from war to a cease-fire and peace negotiations.

The Isdud Battle, 2/3 June 1948

The missing military dimension of the war is especially salient in the existing description and interpretation of the Israeli counter-attack on the Egyptian stronghold in Isdud on the night of 2/3 June 1948. Both conservative and revisionist historians agree that the Israeli attack was a success. Those who admit that the attack itself was a failure nonetheless argue that its strategic consequences were in Israel's favor.54 One scholar even argues that the Israelis dealt the Egyptians a humiliating defeat in that battle.55 Neither version is true. The real story, and the significance, of the events that took place that night have been obscured by ideological biases, negligence of existing documents, and a focus on the narrative of one side. The Israeli attack was in reality a failure that demonstrated the capabilities of the Egyptian command and the shortcomings of the Israelis, while the alleged strategic results, according to which the attack forced the Egyptians to withdraw from their plan to advance further north, were irrelevant as at this stage the commander of the Egyptian expeditionary force had no such plan.

The decision to launch the counter-attack was made in expectation of the cease-fire that was being negotiated by the United Nations' mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. Assuming that a truce might come into effect in short order, the Israeli General Staff instructed the 5th (Givati) Brigade to launch an all-out attack on the Egyptian force at Isdud with the aim of destroying it. This decision is usually explained as arising from the concern that the Egyptians would try to "keep pushing northward towards Tel Aviv, which was only 32 kilometers away."56 However, no such consideration can be discerned in the attack order, codenamed "Pleshet" (Land of the Philistines), which stated that the Egyptians' "aim is not known. . . . It must be assumed that this is a diversionary force that has the task of pinning down our forces in order to enable another [Egyptian] force to operate in the area."57 The identity of the "other force" remains a mystery, but it is perfectly clear that no one on the General Staff seriously thought that the Egyptians were about to push north. Probably the underlying reason for the decision to attack and annihilate the Egyptian column was the assessment that the success of the operation would free forces that could then be rushed to assist in the battle for the road to Jerusalem, which Ben-Gurion considered crucial. Both Ben- Gurion and the General Staff believed-on the basis of the low opinion in which they held the Egyptians' combat capability-that it was possible to achieve the ambitious plan. Afterwards, if the truce failed to come into effect, it would be possible "to plan the operation for the liberation of Jerusalem," Ben-Gurion maintained.58

The General Staff's assumption was indeed correct. As mentioned above, the Arab war plan stipulated that the Egyptian expeditionary force was to reach Yibna and stay there, in order to confine Israeli forces to that sector, thereby reducing the number of Israeli forces that could be moved to stop the invasion of the other Arab forces in northern Palestine. The Egyptian expeditionary force crossed the Egyptian- Palestinian international border on 15 May and started its journey north. On 24 May it reached Majdal, 30 km. south of Yibna, where its commander, General Ahmad 'Ali al-Muawi, decided to stop. He assumed that a thrust towards Yibna would expose the flank of the Egyptian column to attacks by the Jewish forces and to the danger of being cut in two, as the Egyptians were advancing along one route, stretching their supply lines almost to the limit. General Muawi was well aware of the weakness of his supply system, which lacked reserves of ammunition and arms depots.59 He was also concerned by the presence of Jewish settlements near his route of advance, and to avert possible disruptions to his supply lines he decided to concentrate on widening his area of control to the east of his line of supply, thereby removing any threat from that direction.60 Muawi realized that his connection with the rear echelon ran along a route that was lined with tenacious Jewish settlements, and he was undoubtedly acquainted with the assessments that had been presented to the Palestine Committee concerning the strength of the Jewish forces. The report also stated that "it has already been proved that all the Jewish settlements, from the smallest to the largest, are well fortified . . . and all of them are fully equipped for defense. Reality has shown that it is impossible to overcome and capture these settlements solely with light weapons."61 The mission was assigned to the Egyptian 9th Battalion, which was instructed to launch the attack on the Jewish settlements to the east of the Egyptian line of supply on 29 May, but meanwhile the encampment of the Egyptian forces incensed the Jordanians, who were being left to face the Israelis alone. At this time the Israelis were attacking Latrun, and Glubb requested Muawi to push ahead further north, to ease the pressure on the Legion, but the Egyptian commander, fearing that he would encounter Israeli forces, rejected the request.62 It was only after the issue was treated on a governmental level, with Amman asking the Egyptian government for assistance, that Muawi was ordered to move north and relieve the pressure from the Jordanian forces at Latrun. Against his will, then, Muawi resumed his march north on 28 May, towards the Yibna-Isdud area. The Egyptian force, which consisted (apparently) of three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion, deployed at the ruins of the bridge on the main road leading into the heart of Israel.63

When the Egyptians encamped at the bridge next to Isdud that had been destroyed by Israeli sappers a few days before, there were no Israeli forces to block their way and prevent them from continuing their advance. The Givati Brigade sent reports to the General Staff about the Egyptians' movements and the fact that they had stopped, but did not send troops to confront them. The Givati command was well aware that the destroyed bridge could not prevent the Egyptian commander from advancing if he wished to.64 However, as noted above, the Egyptians had no intention of moving further north both because their plan stipulated their encampment in Yibna-Isdud and because any further advance northward would have made the column's flank intolerably vulnerable to attack by the Israeli forces and overextended the force's supply lines to the breaking point. The Egyptian advance thus came to a final halt near Yibna, in an area that was still outside the boundaries of the Jewish state according to the November 1947 partition resolution.65

The Israeli decision to launch the counter-attack seems to have arisen from an almost instinctive feeling that after several weeks in which the Arabs had held the initiative, it was now time to reverse the trend and to put the Arab side on the defense. The aim of Operation Pleshet was to destroy the "enemy force" by means of frontal attacks on the Egyptian concentration in the Isdud area and to occupy the territory it was holding.66 The attacking forces did not know exactly what they were up against or where the Egyptian forces were located. In the order all the references to the Egyptian formation were couched in terms of "unknown," "as conjectured," or "we have to assume."67 The Egyptian 2nd Battalion was deployed in the area between the Isdud train station and the village itself; while the 9th Battalion, considered the best of the Egyptians' units, was based in the area between the Isdud bridge and the train station. A company of medium machine guns took up positions between the 2nd and 9th Battalions, strengthening the Egyptians' lines. The Egyptians' defenses were further beefed up by the deployment of two armored platoons, a light tank platoon, and a battery of 25-pounder and 3.700 guns. The 9th Battalion had been reinforced with additional medium machine guns. All told, the Egyptian fighting force was about 2,300-strong.68

The Israelis had half that number of combat personnel. The Givati Brigade was reinforced by the Negev Brigade's 7th Battalion and by companies from its commando battalion. The soldiers of the 7th battalion were new immigrants who had acquired their military training in battle. The attack was set for the night of 1/2 June, with two forces slated to launch the assault at two separate points. As the Israeli forces were making their way towards the Egyptian lines, they received an order to call off the operation in the wake of reports that the Egyptians had accepted the Security Council's call for a truce.69 However, it soon turned out that the actual time for the truce to come into effect had not yet been set.70 It did not take long for the Israelis to realize that the information they had received about the truce was wrong, but in any case Ben-Gurion and the General Staff decided to continue fighting and to implement the assault at Isdud.71

Operation Pleshet, which was launched on the night of 2 June 1948, was a failure. The Egyptians repulsed the Israeli forces and in some cases pursued them as they retreated. Over 50 Israeli soldiers were killed or missing and about the same number wounded.72 A decade later, Shimon Avidan, the commander of the 5th Brigade, regretted having carried out the attack, but there is also evidence that he objected to the plan at the time it was discussed.73 Indeed, the very plan of the operation doomed it to almost certain failure. The main problem, as the semi-official history of the Givati Brigade shows, was that the planners took into account neither the advantage a defensive force enjoys over an attacking force nor the serious numerical inferiority of the Israeli force. The battle plan failed to address, and hence to exploit, the fact that the Egyptian lines, though dense, were spread over a fairly wide area. Instead of making a concentrated effort to breach the lines at one point or to sever the Egyptians from their rear echelon by attacking the more southern 2nd Battalion, the Israelis split their forces into small units, each of which was assigned a specific sector to breach. In every sector the attacking forces were numerically inferior and possessed less effective firepower. The artillery at their disposal was scant and, according to Avidan, was not utilized intelligently. It did not take a great effort for the dense Egyptian defensive alignment, based on concentrated machine-gun and artillery fire, to break the attack. Disparagement of the Egyptians' combat ability, defective intelligence, and a faulty battle plan were the major factors that led to the failure of the attempt to destroy and rout the Egyptian forces around Isdud.74

Nevertheless, Israeli historiography takes pride in the accomplishment of Operation Pleshet, viewing it, despite the failure, as "a strategic victory of supreme and decisive importance."75 It seems, however, that the battle had little impact on the Egyptians' war plans. Operatively, the Egyptian move had had limited objectives-at most to capture the Arab village of Yibna-and this was also the assessment of Haganah intelligence.76 As we saw, the reason why the Egyptian column came to a halt at the ruins of the Isdud bridge was not because it was stopped by Israeli forces. Indeed, it should be recalled that Muawi reached Isdud only because he was ordered to, with the aim of pinning down Israeli forces in the southern sector and thus taking some of the pressure off the Jordanians at Latrun; and Ben-Gurion, too, wanted to attack the Egyptians so that he could free more troops to help at Latrun. From their point of view, the Egyptians accomplished their goal, as the invading force was able to repulse an attack and thus compel the Israelis to continue committing troops to the south.

Conclusion

There is some irony in the statement that the missing dimension in the historiography of the 1948 war is precisely the study of its military history. After all, this was where the study on the war started: Nethanel Lorch's history of the war was already published in 1958; many books told the story of the brigades and other units that took part in the war; and Elhanan Oren, one of the most prolific scholars of the war, has enriched us with his studies since the 1970s.77 However, the shortcomings of these studies, which I mentioned at the beginning of this article, were not addressed in the work of the new historians. In some cases, it is even argued outright that "the historian of the war should pay less attention to its military development, and instead address the political aspects."78 This article has sought to show the contrary, that it is precisely a detailed military history of the war, based on systematic study of the pertinent documents, that can shed light on political and diplomatic aspects that would otherwise remain unknown or obscure. Studying the military history of the war without bias and political orientation can thus shed light on what really happened in 1948, during the first Arab-Israeli war.

Notes

[1] Morris, "The New Historiography."
[2] Lorch, Korot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (1989); Oren, Ha-derekh el ha-ir Pappe´, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan.
[3] Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 3-128; Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars; Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive; Bregman, Israel's Wars, 1947-93.
[4] Ben-Gurion, Medinat Yisrael ha-mehudeshet, 76; Gelber, Garin le-tzava ivri, 103-6; Lorch, Korot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (1958), 121-22; Morris, Righteous Victims, 202-4; Oren, "Ha- ma'arakhah," 36; Pa'il, Mi-"Haganah" li-tzva haganah, 295, 305-6; Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 85-86; Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, 156; Sela, "Aravyei Eretz Yisrael," 158-59.
[5] British Legation, Damascus: "Political Summary for February and March, 1948," Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), FO 371/68808; Me'ahorei ha-pargod, 51-52.
[6] Me'ahorei ha-pargod, 100-101.
[7] Ibid., 76, 82-85.
[8] Record of Conversation [Between a British Officer of the Arab Legion and a Visitor from the Hebron District], 28 January 1948, PRO, FO 816/116; Sela, "Aravyei Eretz Yisrael," 130-35.
[9] Records of the convoys plying the road from the Coastal Plain to Jerusalem, and reports of attacks on convoys all over the country reached the Haganah command on a daily basis from December 1947. These reports are deposited in the Military (IDF) and Defense Establishment Archives, Givatayim (hereafter IDFA), 464/54/2; report by "Benjamin," 26 February 1948, Haganah Archives, Tel Aviv (hereafter HA), 80/50/21.
[10] Gen. Sir A. Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: Weekly Intelligence Appreciation (hereafter WIA), 1 and 14 February 1948, PRO, CO 537/3869; British Legation, Damascus: "Political Summary for February and March, 1948," PRO, FO 371/68808; intelligence reports, 24 March 1948, HA 105/98; Sela, "Aravyei Eretz Yisrael," 154, 156, 158.
[11] Intelligence reports, 3 March 1948, HA 105/98; Gen. Sir A. Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: WIA, 8 March 1948, PRO, FO 816/117.
[12] Intelligence reports, 4 March 1948, HA 105/98.
[13] Gen. Sir A. Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: WIA, 17 January 1948, PRO, CO 537/3869.
[14] Cable to "Sasha" (Y. Alon) from Y. Yadin, January 1948, IDFA, 661/69/36; cable from E. Denin to E. Shiloah, 13 January 1948, Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem (hereafter CZA), S/25/9007; Gen. Sir A. Cunningham to Secretary of State Colonies: WIA, 16 and 24 January 1948, PRO, CO 537/3869; cable from "Adina" to "Hilel" (I. Galili), 3 February 1948, IDFA, 464/54/2; cable from "Max," 4 February 1948, CZA, S/25/9007; Gen. Sir A. Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: WIA, 7 February 1948, PRO, FO 816/116; from Amman to Foreign Office, 9 February 1948, PRO, FO 371/68366; "The Army for the Salvation of Palestine" [unsigned paper], 13 February 1948, , S25/3999; from the High Commissioner for Palestine to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: WIA, 14 February 1948, CO 537/3869; "Tene," intelligence report, 20 February 1948, HA, 80/50/21. On the training program the "volunteers" had undergone, see J. Palmon's report, 26 February 1948, HA, 80/50/21; "Tene/Yavne," "The volunteers in Jerusalem," 3 March 1948, HA, 105/216/1; "Tene/Yavne," intelligence report, 15 March 1948, IDFA, 661/69/36; "Tene/Yavne," "The Arab force in Jerusalem," 16 March 1948, IDFA, 661/69/36; Me'ahorei ha-pargod, 82-84; Levy, Tishah kabin, 354-55.
[15] Daily report, 1 April 1948, IDFA, 464/54/2; Sefer toldot ha-Haganah 3.2: 1443-56.
[16] See also a report on the Palestinians' destruction of the Yehiam convoy: Intelligence reports, 1 April 1948, HA 105/98.
[17] Gen. Sir A. Cunningham to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: WIA, 20 March 1948, CO 537/3869.
[18] Intelligence reports: "Tene/Naim," 3 March 1948; "Tene/Matspa," 5 March 1948; "Tene/Sasha," 7 March 1948; "Tene/Yavne," 10 March 1948; "Tene/Yavne," 15 March 1948; "Tene/Avner," 25 March 1948; "Tene/Naim," 6 April 1948; "Tene/Mitspa," 7 April 1948. All in IDFA, 661/69/36.
[19] Plan B had explicitly assumed that "following the policy conducted by the [Mandate] government, a [Jewish-Arab] war will not exceed the level of 'small war'." "Plan B," September 1945. HA, 73/100. "The May 1946 Plan," HA, 73/140.
[20] Galili in meeting of the Yishuv Security Committee, 13 November 1947. CZA, S25/9343; Ben-Gurion in meeting of Mapai Political Committee, 9 December 1947 and 8 January 1948, Labor Party Archives, Beit Berl, Israel, 25/47, and 25/48; Y. Ben-Zvi in meeting of Mapai Political Committee 11 October 1947, in Avizohar, ed., Akhshav o le'olam lo, 183. Ben-Gurion on equal rights for the Arab citizens of the Jewish state, speech to the Keren ha-Yesod convention, 29 October 1947, in Ben-Gurion Pe'amei medinah, 438.
[21] Minutes of a meeting on Arab Affairs, 1-2 January 1948, HA, 80/50/21; Israel Galili in Gilad, ed., Sefer ha-Palmah, January 1948, xx-xxii; February 1948, xxii-xxiv; Ben-Gurion, letter to M. Shertok and G. Meyerson, 14 March 1948, Memoranda files, the Ben-Gurion Research Center, Sde Boker Campus, Israel (hereafter BGA).
[22] Summary of the Military Situation, 1 April 1948, IDFA, 922/75/595; I. Galili report, 4 April 1948, HA, 80/50/18.
[23] Ber, Bitahon Yisrael, 125-26; Rogan, "Jordan and 1948," 109-10; Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 119-21; Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, 1-2.
[24] Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 6 October 1947, PRO, FO 371/61497; Mr. Evans, Beirut to Foreign Office, 12 October 1947, PRO, FO 371/61530; Nevo, Abdallah, 50-51.
[25] Me'ahorei ha-pargod, 23, 148-50; Be-einei oyev, 82, 89-90; and see the testimony of Gamal Abd el-Nasser quoted in Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 97, 105.
[26] Record of Conversation between Brig. Glubb Pesha and D.M.I. War Office, Jan. 30, 1948, PRO, FO 371/68369; Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 13 April 1948, PRO, FO 371/68852; Me'ahorei ha-pargod, 145-46, 149-50.
[27] For a fuller discussion, see Tal, War in Palestine, 205-14.
[28] Golda Meyerson in a meeting of the People's Administration (Minhelet ha-Am), Protokolim yeshivot ha-memshalah, 18 April-13 Mai 1948, 40-43.
[29] A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 24 April 1948, PRO, FO 371/68852.
[30] A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 23 April 1948, PRO, FO 371/68852.
[31] R. Zaslani to M. Shertok, 3 May 1948, Yogev, ed., Te'udot mediniyot: Detzember 1947-april 1948, 721-22.
[32] Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah 1:409, entry for 11 May 1948; 411, entry for 12 May 1948.
[33] Meeting: M. Shertok, E. Epstein-G. Marshall, R. Lovett, D. Rusk, 8 May 1948, in Yogev, ed., Te'udot mediniyot: Detzember 1947-april 1948, 759.
[34] Pa'il, Mi-"Haganah" li-tzva haganah, 325-35.
[35] Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 15 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68372; telegram no. 338 from Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 16 May 1948, PRO, CO 537/5315.
[36] Telegram from the Sixth Brigade to Yadin, 14 May 1948, IDFA, 922/75/1175; Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, 82-83; al-Rossan, "Ma'arakhot Bab al Wad," 147.
[37] Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 19 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68506; telegram no. 358 from Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman to Foreign Office, 21 May 1948, CO 537/5315; Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, 105; al-Tal, Zikhronot, 65; Levy, Jerusalem in the War of Independence, 240; al-Rossan, "Ma'arakhot Bab al Wad," 147.
[38] Telegram no. 357 from Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 20 May 1948, PRO, FO 816/120.
[39] Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, 106-10, 113.
[40] Report by C.V. Herzog, 21 May 1948, in Yogev, ed., Te'udot mediniyot: Detzember 1947-April 1948, 46-47.
[41] Mr. Beaumont, Jerusalem to Foreign Office, 17 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68505; British Legation Amman: Monthly Situation Report on Transjordan for the Month of May, 2 June 1948, PRO, FO 371/68845.
[42] Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 17 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68829; telegram no. 348 from Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 19 May 1948, PRO, FO 816/120; conversation with Major Abdullah al-Tal, 24 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68641; Ibrahim Kandalfat, "After the Mandate" (pt. 7), Al Bilad (Jordan), 4 January 1954, IDFA, 922/75/693; al-Tal, Zikhronot, 75, 79; Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, 109-11.
[43] Telegram no. 358 from Sir A. A. Kirkbride, Amman to Foreign Office, 21 May 1948, CO 537/5315.
[44] Telegram no. 343 from Sir A. A. Kirkbride, Amman to Foreign Office, 18 May 1948, CO 537/5315; Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 19 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68506; conversation with Major Abdullah al-Tal, 24 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68641; al-Tal, Zikhronot, 79-81; Levy, Tishah kabin, 57.
[45] Mr. Beaumont, Jerusalem to Foreign Office, 18 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68505; telegram from Etzioni to Yadin, 26 May 1948, IDFA, 922/75/1175; telegram from Etzioni to Yadin, 27 and 29 May 1948, IDFA, 922/75/1175; Sir A. A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 29 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68374; al-Tal, Zikhronot, 83-84, 86-87, 88-90, 100-101, 103-7; Shaltiel, Yerushalayim, 176-78. A detailed report on the situation in the Old City and the circumstances that led to its surrender is in Mr. Beaumont, Jerusalem to Foreign Office, 30 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68510.
[46] Lorch, Korot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (1989), 287-91.
[47] Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:453, entry for 24 May 1948; 457 and 459-60, entry for 26 May 1948.
[48] Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:453, entry for 24 May 1948; 457 and 459-60, 453, entry for 24 May 1948.
[49] From C in C, MELF to War Office, 25 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68621.
[50] Sir A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 15 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68372; telegram from the Arab Legion HQ, Amman to Qawukji, 18/5/1948, HA 105/129; al-Qawukji, "Memoir, 1948," 26.
[51] Al-Rossan, "Ma'arakhot Bab al Wad," 148-50.
[52] Ibid., 148-49.
[53] Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, 110; al-Rossan, "Ma'arakhot Bab al Wad," 151.
[54] Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 142; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 3:771; Lorch, Korot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (1989), 327-28, 331.
[55] Pappeé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 140.
[56] Lorch, Korot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (1989), 327; Editor's Preface, in Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:423; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 2:756, 770-71.
[57] Operations Branch Cable to Givati (and others), 1 June 1948 in Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 113; Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:473, entry for 31 May 1948.
[58] Ben-Gurion Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:472, entry for 31 May 1948; for a report on the Egyptians' inferior warfare capabilities, see Palmah Memorandum, 16 May 1948, IDFA 661/69/36.
[59] Sir A. A. Kirkbride, Amman, to the Foreign Office, 24 May 1948, PRO, FO 371/68373.
[60] Hativat ha-negev be-milhamah, 66, 70-71; Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:427, entry for 17 May 1948; 432, entry for 17 May 1948; 438, entry for 18 May 1948. For the fears of the Egyptian commander and his cautious planning of the campaign, see Kimche and Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill, 149-50.
[61] Be-einei oyev, 80, 89, 96, 99-100.
[62] H.M. Minister, Amman, to Secretary of State, London, 23 May 1948, PRO, FO 816/121; see the testimony of a captured Egyptian artillery officer in Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 105.
[63] Operation/Intelligence, "The Egyptian Army in Palestine," 26 July 1948, HA 105/138; Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 97-98, 105; Be-einei oyev, 89-90; Me'ahorei ha-pargod, 157; Nasser, "Memoirs of the First Palestine War," 14; an Egyptian artillery officer reported that the force heading northward was ordered to take positions north of Isdud. Report by an Egyptian Lt. Col. to the Artillery HQ: "Summary of the First Artillery Brigade in the Palestine Campaigns, 15 May-11 June," HA 105/138; Ben-Gurion suspected that the Egyptian advance was aimed to divert Israeli forces from the Jerusalem front, and to make it easier for the Jordanian Legion to capture the city. Minutes of the Provisional Government meeting, 30 May 1948, ISA.
[64] Givati Cable to Yadin, 29 and 31 May 1948, IDFA 922/75/1175; Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 548.
[65] Be-einei oyev, 80, 89, 96, 99-100; the Egyptian artillery officer made no reference to the destroyed bridge in his report (see n. 63 above). Report by an Egyptian Lt. Col. to the Artillery HQ: "Summary of the First Artillery Brigade in the Palestine Campaigns, May 15-June 11," HA 105/138.
[66] Operations/Southern Section: Operation Pleshet Order, 1 June 1948, in Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 112-13.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid., 118-21.
[69] Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:477, entry for 2 June 1948; Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 116; Gilad, ed., Sefer ha-Palmah, 2:862.
[70] A. Eban and G. Ruffer to M. Shertok, 31 May 1948, in Yogev, ed., Te'udot mediniyot: Mai 1948-september 1948, 103; Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:481, entry for 2 June 1948; A. Eban to M. Shertok, 2 June 1948, in Yogev, ed., Te'udot mediniyot: Mai 1948-September 1948, 113; Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 88.
[71] M. Shertok to A. Eban, 2 June 1948, in Yogev, ed., Te'udot mediniyot: Mai 1948-September 1948, 112; Ben-Gurion, Yoman ha-milhamah, 2:478, entry for 2 June 1948.
[72] "[IDF] Fatal Casualties," IDFA 922/1975/1189; Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 119-42; Gilad, ed., Sefer ha-Palmah, 2:862-63.
[73] Stated by Avidan in 1958. Quoted in Dagan and Yakir, Shimon Avidan Givati, 240.
[74] Gilad, ed., Sefer ha-Palmah, 2:863; Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 121 (for a full description of the battle, see 123-40).
[75] Ayalon, Hativat "Givati", 142; Lorch, Korot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (1989), 331; Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 2:771.
[76] Intelligence report, "Survey of the Situation in the Negev Ahead of the Ceasefire," 17 June 1948, HA 105/124/1.
[77] A brilliant survey of the literature written during those early days is Bar-On, Zikaron ba-sefer.
[78] Pappeé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, viii.

References

Avizohar, Meir, ed. Akhshav o le'olam lo (Now or never). Ayanot: Beit Berl, 1989.
Ayalon, Avraham. Hativat "Givati" mul ha-polesh ha-mitzri (The Givati Brigade facing the Egyptian invasion). Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1959.
Bar-On, Mordechai. Zikaron ba-sefer: Reshitah shel ha-historiografiyah ha-yisraelit shel milhemet ha-atzma'ut, 1948-1958 (Memory in the book: The beginning of the Israeli historiography of the 1948 war, 1948-1958). Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 2001.
Bar-Zohar, Michael. David Ben Gurion (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1977.
Be-einei oyev (In enemy eyes) Translated by Shmuel Segev. Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1954.
Ben-Gurion, David. Medinat Yisrael ha-mehudeshet (The restored State of Israel). Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969.
---. Pe'amei medinah (Chimes of Independence). Edited by Avizohar Meir. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1993.
---. Yoman ha-milhamah: Milhemet ha-atzma'ut, 1947-1948 (War diary: The War of Independence, 1947-1948). 3 vols. Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1982.
Ber, Israel. Bitahon Yisrael: Etmol, ha-yom, mahar (Israel's security: Yesterday, today, tomorrow). Tel Aviv: Amikam, 1966.
Bregman, Ahron. Israel's Wars, 1947-93. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
Dagan, Shaul and Yakir Eliahu. Shimon Avidan Givati (Hebrew). Givat Haviva: Yad Ya'ari, 1995.
Dupuy, Trevor N. Elusive Victory. New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
Gelber, Yoav. Garin le-tzava ivri (The nucleus of a Hebrew army). Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, 1986.
Gilad, Zrubabel, ed. Sefer ha-Palmah (Book of the Palmah). Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbutz ha-Me'uhad, 1956.
Glubb. John B. A Soldier with the Arabs. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957.
Hativat ha-negev be-milhamah (The Negev Brigade in war). Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, n.d.
Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. New York: Random House, 1982.
Ilan, Amitzur. Bernadotte in Palestine,1948. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Kimche, John and David. Both Sides of the Hill. London: Secker & Warburg, 1960.
Levy, Itzhak. Tishah kabin: Yerushalayim bi-kravot milhemet ha-atzma'ut (Nine measures: Jerusalem in the War of Independence). Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1986.
Lorch, Nethanel. Korot milhemet ha'atzma'ut (Israel's War of Independence). Ramat Gan: Massadah, 1958.
Lorch, Nethanel. Korot milhemet ha'atzma'ut (Israel's War of Independence). Tel Aviv: Yedi'ot Aharonot, 1989.
Me'ahorei ha-pargod: Va'adah parlamentarit irakit al ha-milhamah be-Yisrael (Behind the curtain: Iraqi Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on the Palestine War). Translated by S. Segev. Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1954.
Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999. London: J. Murray, 1999.
Morris, Benny. "The New Historiography: Israel Confronts Its Past." Tikkun 3, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1988): 19-23, 99-102.
Nasser, Gamal Abdul. "Memoirs of the First Palestine War." Translated and annotated by Walid Khalidi Journal of Palestine Studies 2, no. 2 (winter 1973): 3-32.
Nevo, Yosef. Abdallah ve-aravyei Eretz Yisrael (Abdullah and the Arab Palestinians). Tel Aviv: Papirus, 1975.
Oren, Elhanan. Ha-derekh el ha-ir (The Road to the City). Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1976.
Oren, Elhanan. "Ha-ma'arakhah al mevo'ot Yerushalayim, April 1948." (The campaign on Jerusalem's outskirts, April 1948). Ma'arakhot, no. 243-244 (April-May 1975).
Pa'il, Meir. Mi-"Haganah" li-tzva haganah (From the Haganah to the IDF). Tel Aviv: Zmora, Modan, Bitan, 1979.
Pappe´, Ilan. The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992.
Protokolim yeshivot ha-memshalah, 18 April-13 Mai 1948 (Minutes of government meetings, 18 April-13 May 1948). Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1978.
al-Qawukji, Fauzi. "Memoirs, 1948, Part I." Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 4 (Summer 1972): 27-58.
Rogan, Eugene L. "Jordan and: the Persistence of an Official History." In The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
al-Rossan, Rais Mahmud. "Ma'arakhot Bab al Wad" (The Bab al Wad campaigns)(In enemy eyes). Translated by Shmuel Segev. Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1954.
Ben-Zion, Dinur, ed. Sefer toldot ha-Haganah (The history of the Haganah). Jerusalem: Ma'arakhot and Ha-Sifriyah ha-Tziyonit, 1954-72.
Sela, Avraham. "The Arab Palestinians in the 1948 War." In The Palestinian National Movement: From Confrontation to Reconciliation? edited by Maoz Moshe and B. -Z. Kedar. Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1996.
Shlaim, Avi. Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Shaltiel, David. Yerushalayim tasha"h (Jerusalem 1948). Tel Aviv: [Private Publication], 1981.
al-Tal, Abdullah. Zikhronot Abdullah al-Tal (Abdullah al-Tal's Memoirs). Tel Aviv: Ma'arakhot.
Tal, David. War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.
Van Creveld, Martin. The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force. New York: Public Affairs, 1998.
Yogev, Gedalya, ed. Te'udot mediniyot ve-diplomatiyot: Detzember 1947-April 1948 (Political and diplomatic documents, December 1947-April 1948). Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1979.
---. ed. Te'udot mediniyot ve-diplomatiyot: Mai 1948-September 1948 (Political and diplomatic documents, May 1948-September 1948). Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1981.