Righteous Victims: A History Of The Zionist-arab Conflict - 1881-2001
Benny Morris
The First Stages of the War
In the first stages of the war, the Palestinians had the initiative and their means and capabilities dictated the nature of their activities. Another determining factor was geography, which worked in the Palestinians' favor and, in a way, determined the nature of the fighting. Most of the Jewish population was concentrated along the coast in a dense strip stretching from Rehovot-Rishon Letzion through Tel Aviv up to Haifa. Jewish settlements existed south and north of this strip, but they were scattered and isolated. Another smaller Jewish concentration existed along the valley ('the Izrael Valley') stretching east of Haifa and west of Tiberias-these two end-cities were of mixed population. Arab- populated areas were located in mid and east Galilee and the mountainous area stretching from the Jenin area to the Hebron area to the south. This part of the country, with the exception of Jerusalem, which was located mid-way between these two Arab cities, remained out of the war.
A few Jewish settlements existed inside the Arab-dominated area, mainly along the coast in west Galilee; and a few more isolated Jewish settlements were to be found north and south of Jerusalem. The Jewish-dominated area, mainly along the coast, was dotted with Arab villages, which in many cases controlled the roads leading from one Jewish city to another. This was the case along the Tel Aviv-Rehovot road and the Tel Aviv-Haifa road. Arab villages that lay across these routes could, if they wished, stop the traffic along the roads. Jerusalem was a conspicuous example of this. This city, which according to the Partition Resolution was to be internationalized, contained 100,000 Jews, most of them in its western part, and 65,000 Arabs. The Jews defied the Partition Resolution, and were determined to include the city-at least its Jewish part-within the boundaries of the Jewish State. Arab villages, however, surrounded the city, and the only road connect- ing it with the Jewish coastal area was under the complete control of the Palestinians, who took full advantage of that situation. 41
Most Palestinian activity in the cities consisted of small-scale terrorism: rioting, sniping, bomb-planting and so on. They did not engage in guerrilla warfare against their neighbors, nor did they storm the Jewish neighbourhoods or try to take them over. However, there were some exceptions to this general rule. On a few occasions, Hasan Salama and 'Abd al-Qa-dir al-Husayni' had tried unsuccessfully to lead organized attacks against Jewish settlements and neighborhoods. The ALA was also involved in a few such attempts during the inter-communal conflict phase, but was also defeated. The first attempt by organized guerrillas to attack a Jewish neighborhood had been made by Hasan Salama, who led a futile attack on a Tel Aviv suburb on 8 December 1947. Hasan Salama mustered hundreds of Palestinians from al-Ramla, Lydda, and even from Nablus, and led them in an attack on a suburb of Tel Aviv. However, the Hagana had been informed of the attack, and was waiting. After a three-hour battle, the Palestinians had to withdraw; nearly 100 of Hasan Salama's men were killed, and the experience was not repeated.42
The next occasion, which ended in a similar way, was the attack on the Jewish settlements in Gush Etsion, south of Jerusalem, on 14 January 1948. The Gush was located in the middle of an Arab- populated area, on the Jerusalem-Hebron road, 18 km north of Hebron and 10 km south of Jerusalem. It consisted of four settlements, in which about 550 men and women lived; more than 300 of them were residents of the settlements and the rest were Hagana members sent to assist the Gush residents. Fearing an attack by al-Husayni, on 14 January the Gush settlers ambushed Arab transportation along the Hebron- Jerusalem road. A fight ensued with the local Palestinian forces, and the 300 men from al-Husayni forces who were in the training camp were in Bayt Surif and were joined by more than 300 local Palestinians who had been alerted, attacked the Gush. The attack was broken up when a small Palmah unit counter-attacked. The Palestinians retreated having suffered dozens of casualties, while among the Gush members there were three dead. The attack and, more clearly, the consequences, sharply demonstrated the Palestinian weaknesses and Jewish advantages at this stage of the inter-communal war. The Arabs were disorganized, even those from the training camp, and their attack lacked focus. The attack was sporadic and uncoordinated, with no central command or direction; local commanders led diverse and isolated groups and dis- regarded the other forces. The Jews, on the other hand, were well organized; their defense line was organized by a central command, which shifted and operated forces according to developments along the various fronts. The Jews suffered a painful blow though after the battle, when 35 Palmah combatants were sent to reinforce the Gush defenders: as they walked from the Jerusalem area to the Gush, they were caught and killed by local Palestinians.43
To these two experiences one should add the similarly futile attacks on Kfar Uriya (11 January 1948), Yehiam (20 January 1948) and Tirat Tzvi (16 February 1948)-the ALA forces perpetrated the last two attacks. The attack on Yehiam was carried out by a group of 200-300 men who infiltrated Palestine from Syria and established themselves in the Safad area. Its leader was a German officer, and the group was disci- plined and equipped with rifles and mortars, hitherto unseen among the Arabs. They even brought supplies with them to avoid having to make unpopular demands on villagers. This force attacked Yehiam, using mortars and automatic weapons, but the defenders, who were later assisted by British troops, repelled the attack.44 An ALA unit from Jenin carried out the attack on Tirat Tzvi. Due to early intelligence, the Hagana was ready to meet the assailants, and the attack was once again
Communal War 53
repelled. The Jews sustained two injuries, one fatal and one wounded, while the Arabs suffered 44 dead and dozens of wounded. British forces arrived at the scene, but their intervention was unnecessary.45 The attacks did not signify the decision of the ALA to join the fighting, as Qawukji pledged once more to avoid action as long as the British were in charge.46
These experiences taught the ex-Mufti and his local commanders that their forces were unfit to face the Jews, while the more able force- the ALA-was unavailable to them. One lesson learnt was not to repeat the attacks on Jewish settlements. A second important lesson was the need to improve the quality of their manpower and their capabilities. This was done and by March there was a marked change (see below). Another lesson was that the intensification of fighting in the cities and the continuation of fighting along the roads could be successful strate- gies. The Palestinians succeeded in disrupting Jewish transportation; during the first weeks of the riots, their attacks almost brought it to a halt; but their success was short-lived, as it was not long before the Jews found solutions to this problem. One important element was British assistance: Ben-Gurion urged the British High Commissioner to send in British forces in order to secure transportation in Arab-controlled areas, and he did so. In mid-December, the High Commissioner announced to the Jewish leadership that the British security forces had taken upon themselves responsibility for the Old City in Jerusalem, the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, the Jerusalem-Hebron road and the roads in south Palestine. In view of this, Cunningham demanded that the Jews stop their reprisal attacks and restrain the Jewish dissidents groups.47
Despite the Jewish tendency to blame the British for not assisting them, or accusing them of taking the ex-Mufti's side,48 British security forces came to the rescue of Jewish cars or convoys that were caught in Arab fire on many occasions, especially along the road to Jerusalem. British security forces patrolled the Jerusalem-Jaffa road and, at least until early March, in some cases, British Army forces rescued Jewish cars that ran into Arab ambushes.49 The Jews also took steps of their own to meet the Palestinian challenge. It was suggested that Arab transportation should be so severely attacked that the attacks on Jewish transportation would stop;50 and new roads were also built to bypass regions controlled by the Palestinians.51 By the end of December, a new solution was worked out. Jewish transportation through sensitive areas proceeded in the convoys protected by armed members of Hagana, and the vehicles were armor-plated.52 These solutions temporarily relieved the pressure on the Hagana, and even though Jewish-Palestinian hostilities continued, in January 1948, Ben-Gurion announced 'the current phase of the war' as a success.
The Palestinians Successes
It was during March that the tide of the fighting finally changed. In less than two weeks, in what seemed to be a coordinated Palestinian campaign on a national scale, Palestinians attacked and destroyed Jewish convoys in various places throughout the country. On 21 March, Palestinians took up positions along the Jerusalem-Latrun road, and fired at the convoy heading toward Jerusalem. It passed successfully; but three days later the Palestinians attacked the next convoy, consisting of 30 trucks, and only one escaped the shooting and continued on to Jerusalem. The rest of the trucks were trapped, and it was only with the assistance of the British Army that the truck drivers and 14 of the trucks were rescued. The convoy arrived in Jerusalem, only to get trapped again on their way back from the besieged Gush Etsion, to the south of Jerusalem. On this occasion, the truck drivers were rescued again by the British, but the trucks were lost.
The Jews suffered a similar setback in the north of Palestine, on 26 March. A large convoy made its way to bring as many supplies as possi- ble to the isolated Jewish settlements in the north: it comprised ten armored cars and was escorted by a battalion armed with the best avail- able weapons the Carmeli Brigade could get. The convoy broke through Palestinian roadblocks along the road and arrived successfully at the settlements. After unloading its cargo, the battalion made its way back; but this time the Arab forces in the area were expecting it. An ambush was set up near Kabri, under the command of Adib Shishakly, and the convoy was trapped. The Arab forces destroyed the convoy, killing 46 Jewish combatants.141 As happened on the way to Jerusalem, Arab success in destroying what came to be known as the Yehiam Convoy resulted in the complete halt of Jewish transportation to the northwest- ern Galilee, and the settlements there had to receive supplies by air.142
The Hagana was surprised by the success of the Palestinians' 'War on the Roads' campaign, although it should not have been, as there were many indications that this was imminent. Reports about the planned campaign had appeared in the Arab papers,143 and numerous intelligence reports had accumulated in the Hagana files about the intention of the Palestinians to intensify their struggle over the roads, and to mount a massive campaign, aiming to bring a halt to Jewish transportation, mainly to isolated locations, but foremost to Jerusalem.144 Despite the unhindered flow of information from the Hagana intelligence branch to the field units, Hagana deployment did not change, and the convoys continued in the usual manner. Thus, in one week alone, more than 100 men from the Hagana were killed while escorting five convoys that were intercepted by the Palestinians: at Atarot (14), Har-Tuv (11), al-Nabi Daniyal (12), Yehiam (46) and Hulda (24). To these casualties one must add the loss of equipment, arms and vehicles.145 Palestinian successes were the result of their ability to act in an orchestrated manner, making the most of their advantages vis-à-vis Jewish shortcomings. The reinforcement of the Palestinian camp by trained guerrillas, and the effective use of the Faz'a system, by which local villagers were mustered at a certain time ahead of the arrival of a convoy-and which also enabled the Palestinian leaders to gather hundreds of rifle-holders for several hours-all bore results.146
For the Jews, the most worrying aspect of the Palestinian campaign was its success in cutting off Jerusalem from the coastal plain. Up to this point, the continuous Palestinian attempts to disrupt Jewish transporta- tion had failed, and the solutions that the Jews worked out proved effective. From December to the end of February, 236 convoys, consist- ing of 2,160 trucks, carrying almost 9,000 tons of supply, reached Jerusalem. These convoys were subjected to nearly 70 attacks, in which 37 convoy escorts, passengers and drivers were killed. Eight cars were destroyed. In March, only 45 convoys, consisting of 560 trucks, made their way to the city: only 37 reached their destination. The last five convoys, among them the two biggest ever, did not make it. During this month, 36 members of the Hagana were killed on their way to Jerusalem and 23 trucks were destroyed.147
The Jews made another attempt, after the 21 March setback, to bring a 26-truck convoy from Hulda to Jerusalem, but Palestinians from the region rushed to meet the convoy, stopping it shortly after departure. A Palmah unit, whose mission was to secure the passage of the convoy, was attacked by another Palestinian force, and it was not only unable to assist the attacked convoy, but it barely managed to fight its way out. The Jews suffered 22 killed and 16 wounded while the Palestinians sustained between 20 and 40 casual- ties.148 The Palestinian siege on Jerusalem remained in force.
The Last Accords in the Jewish-Palestinian War (Plan Dalet)
The difficulties along the Jerusalem-Latrun road did not reflect the true situation along the Jewish-Palestinian front across the country. The hitherto somewhat static nature of the war, in which neither side had made any territorial gains at the other side's expense, is reflected in the number of casualties on both sides, which were quite similar. Up to early April 1948, Jewish casualties mounted to 875 dead and 1,875 wounded, as compared with 967 Palestinian dead and 1,911 wounded.256 However, after the execution of Plan Dalet, the Hagana was on the offensive and was in control of the intercommunal conflict. An up-dated version of Plan Dalet had been published on 11 May, but by that time the Hagana was in the middle of operations all over the country, making the up- dated version a mere formality. Now, the Hagana had shifted from launching hit-and-run operations, carried out by small guerrilla-like units whose goal was to punish or threaten, to operations conducted by military formations whose goal was to seize territory and to impose Jewish authority. The execution of Plan Dalet entailed not only politi- cal-geographic, but also geographical-demographical repercussions, as the forces acted on an almost regular basis to destroy the villages they occupied and to deport their residents, all in accordance with what was outlined in Plan Dalet. However, Palestinian flight had started even before their forceful deportation. Thousands upon thousands of Palestinians had already chosen to escape from their houses, doing so not because they were forced to, but because they wanted to evade the hardship of war, and, as the war progressed, because of their fear of Jewish retaliation. Stories of Jewish atrocities toward civilians scared the Palestinians, even if they were unfounded. Dayr Yasin was the example that all the Palestinians thought of when they were deciding whether to remain or to escape in the face of the coming Jews. Some remained but many others escaped. The Plan Dalet-related deportations thus only continued a trend that already existed.