The Rise and Fall of the Husaynis, 1840-1922
Ilan Pappe
Preface
The local notables in the Arab provinces, the A'ayan, became the social leadership in their localities due to the double-edged legitimacy granted to them both by their society, which respected the notables' religious standing, and by the central authority in Istanbul, which vested the notables with important positions within the provinces. This impressive position required navigating and balancing skills which became the essence of what the late Albert Hourani called 'the politics of notables'. These tactics were the ethical and political code of the urban society in the Arab world during the Ottoman period and remained so during the transitional era, leading to the emergence of local nationalism and eventually to independence.
This article examines this modus operandi in Jerusalem's leading family, the house of the Husaynis. It argues that this code saw the Husaynis through dramatic upheavals including the two major revolu- tions in Palestine's fortune: the end of Ottomanism in 1908 and the termination of Islamic rule altogether in 1918. It was not however sufficient in the face of Zionism. It was a code that enabled adaptation to every new regime, provided it was not intent on depopulating the country or cleansing it for its own purposes. Against such an ethnic or national ideology, the notables did not carry the authority nor the abilities to save themselves and their own society, as became painfully clear in 1948.
The essence of the 'Politics of Notables' was a careful mediation between the society that the Aa'yan represented, and the authority that appointed them. The notables' peculiar position enabled the central government in Istanbul to administer the provinces from afar and at the same time this position provided a bufter for the local society, albeit not always a resilient one, against the whims and caprices of the regional or central rulers. The key to the notables' success was moderation which, when it worked, enabled this elite to remain in a paramount position through- out the political dramas of the 18th and 19th centuries, a time when the area be- came an arena for colonial competition and a stage for insurgent local rulers, The leading families of Jerusalem in the 18th and 19th centuries practiced to a certain extent this set of political rules; or at least a local version of it. We are particularly interested in their behavior as a social unit towards the end of the Ottoman era. The developments within this phase posed the greatest challenge to the old Ottoman political code and to the rules underlining the 'Politics of Notables'.
In the case of Jerusalem, however, this article will argue that the code remained intact and effective until the outbreak of the First World War. The 'Politics of Nota- bles' was a successful means in the hands of the Husaynis for preserving their status and position in the city of Jerusalem and even in the independent Sanjaq of Jerusa- lem which was established in 1872. The Husaynis sustained their position in the city and even strengthened it by employing the traditional rules of the game. These rules were even helpful in digesting the newest of all human ideological inventions nationalism. The same dexterity that characterized the Husaynis' navigation skills in between the society and the exter- nal authorities could be seen at work once again in the twentieth century, as late as the first decade of British rule in Palestine. They proved, however, useless in the face of Zionism and pro-Zionist British policy.
Historical Background
The Husayni family in around 1860 was divided into two branches. One was de- scended, but not directly, from Hasan al- Husayni, a reputed scholar of the eight- eenth century. Hasan's position was trans- ferred to his nephew Tahir al-Husayni. Hence, the branch which held successfully the position of the Hanafi Mufti stretching until Haj Amin al-Husayni, is referred to as either the Hasani branch or the Tahiri one. The family's adherence to the Hanafi Madhab was a fortunate coincidence since it became in 1785 the favorite Madhab of the sultans in Istanbul.
The second was those in the family who had held in succession the Nikaaba, the title of Naqib al-Ashraf. This post declined in importance by the mid-nineteenth century and was replaced by the mayorship of the city. This branch is referreed to as the Omari branch, after another eighteenth century Husayni who was one of the first in the family to hold the title.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the family began establishing itself as a leading force. In that phase old challenges met new ones. The family's agenda consisted of internal struggles with other rival families for keeping the three posts of Naqib al-Ashraf, the Mufti and Sheikh al-Haram in its hands. Simultaneously, the family had to cope with the aggressiveness and greedi- ness of local Ottoman governors of the city and particularly with the regional gover- nors in Damascus, Beirut and Acre who all strove to control Palestine in the name of the Empire on the one hand, or in the case of the Egyptians, in the name of a new political entity. These political develop- ments intertwined with the mundane business of running the religious institu- tions of the city for those who were in the Nigaba branch or enjoying the richness of theological and literary debates and discussions for those holding the chain of ifta.
At that time, one additional concern required the family's wits and tactfulness in order to be able to stride safely into the Tanzimat period (1840-1876), after surviv- ing Egyptian rule (1831-1840). During the Egyptian period, the family was a leading factor in the rebellion against Muhamad Ali, but was able to mend fences with the Egyptians and nonetheless retain a solid relationship with the returning Ottomans. After the Ottoman rule was reestablished in Palestine in 1840, the family was em- broiled in an ancient rivalry in the vicinity of Jerusalem between the clans of Qais and those of the Yaman allegiances. This division between local clans went back to the rivalries between the Northern (Qais) and Southern (Yaman) tribes in the forma- tive years of Islam in the Arabian Penin- sula and their resettlement in the Fertile Crescent later on.
On the basis of this coalition, the Husaynis, with Yamani affiliations, kept allegiance to the rural lord of the Jerusalem mountains, Mustafa Abu-Ghosh who was in constant friction with Qaisi coalitions for control over land and villages. There is a debate among the scholars of the period on the duration of these feuds. There are those who claim that this sphere of loyalty still existed in 1920, while others see them as of second- ary important ever since the second half of the 19th century. Miram Hexoter sensibly remarks that overall this rivalry was a rural phenomenon and since Jerusalem was more urban in nature it mattered less in this city's affairs.1
None the less conflicts remained in the 1840s and did affect the city's life. The Khalidis led the Qais faction and the Husaynis the Yamani one within the city's parameters. However, the competition between the families was for contemporary positions and not in the name of that or other coalition. The Yamani allegiance was used by the Husaynis as a meditating facility between feuding rural lords or for widening its influence beyond the city's walls. This patronage connection, for instance, strengthened the Husaynis' influence in the Beit Lehem area, as the town was mainly Yamanite.
The role of mediation was a dominant feature in the politics of notables towards the end of the 1850s. In the spring of 1855, there was widespread unrest in Jabal Nablus. The Jarars and the Tuqans collided with the Abd al-Hadis. This was a feud aggravated by the policies of Ibrahim Pasha during his short reign in Palestine where he exercised to perfection the old style divide et impera. The central govern- ment failed constantly to appoint a neutral ruler, each coalition wishing to install its own candidate. The Pasha of Jerusalem and the notables intervened and convinced both sides to accept a compromise candidate, Sheik Darwish of Nabi Daud. The Tuqgans were connected to the Husaynis in mar- riage and thus the Husaynis could induce them to consent to the compromise and were on cordial relations with the rivals and for a while pacified the otherwise turbulent area of Nablus.3
But this seemed to be the last meaningful involvement of the family in such feuds. By the end of the Crimean War, these local conflicts were marginalized in the family's agenda giving way to more serious threats to the family's prestige: foreign interven- tion, the reformist zeal of the last Ottoman rulers culminating in the secularization and Turkifization of the Empire after the Young Turk revolution, and finally the Zionist movement's appearance in Palestine.
The Perils of Foreign Intervention
The Napoleonic invasion in the begin- ning of the 19th century left little impression on Jerusalem. Bonaparte regarded the city as of secondary importance and hence the Ottomans ruled the city more or less uninterruptedly ever since the 16th century. The delegates who ruled in the name of the Empire, and at times challenging its au- thority, alternated in amazing frequency during the 18th century. None of them was too keen on allowing Europeans to settle in Palestine. It was only during the reign of Sultan Mahmud the Second that some sort of foreign presence was tolerated. In 1823 the first British missionaries arrived to convert the Jews, with the aim of precipi- tating the second coming of the Messiah. But this was a minor development, and not a very successful one at that, in the Europeans' position in the city.
A considerable improvement of foreigners' status in the city of Jerusalem occurred only during the reign of Muhammad Ali in Palestine. It had been preceded by Ibrahim Pasha's insistence on equalizing the status of Jews and Christians with that of the Muslims. This was the first time the Husaynis were faced with such a social reality. Tahir al-Husayni, the Mufti, and Muhamad Ali al-Husayni, the Naqib al-Ashraf, were included in a new Majlis al-Shura that included non-Muslims. Their inclusion in the Majlis was, in fact, the result of the leading roles they played in the 1834 Palestine revolt against Egyptian rule.
|Unlike Napoleon's tour de force, the Egyptian conquest was felt with all it onus in Jerusalem; even more so when the city became the center of the 1834 revolt. The | Egyptian period integrated Palestine and Jerusalem into the sphere of the 'Eastern Question' of Europe. Ibrahim opened the way for substantive foreign invasion by allowing European missionaries and consulates to be posted in Jerusalem.
Istanbul followed suit after its re-conquest of Palestine. Immediately after the gviction of the Egyptian forces the central government in Istanbul altered its policy vis a vis foreign intervention in Jerusalem. As usual in the Ottoman-European relationship it were the physical state of the churches in the Empire which indicated how far the Porte was willing to go. By 1841, the Wali of al-Quds was ordered to approve any restoration works needed in the churches of Jerusalem.3
Sultan Abd al-Majid the Second tried to balance these moves by showing more concern for the deteriorating exterior of Haram al-Sharif. But all in all, he antago- nized many of the local notables by in- creasing the powers of the local governors and allowing a free hand for European Consuls, which explains the low ebb in his relations with the family. The family's fortunes, in political terms, were dwindling during Abd al-Majid's period. It took the Husaynis another fifteen years to restore their former position with an extremely clever exploitation of the 'politics of nota- bles'. It was highly important for them to do so because of the demographic changes in the city. Playing a leading role in Jerusa- lem became of regional importance as the city became a large populated center, in comparison with former days. When Abd al-Majid returned Ottoman rule to Jerusa- lem it had 22,000 inhabitants - by 1861 there were about 68,000.4
But before attaining such success, the family went through difficult times, par- ticularly vis a vis the European Consuls and in particular the British Consul, James Finn. Finn is still celebrated to-day in Israeli historiography as a reliable source and as a precursor of pro-Zionist British politicians. However, it seems that the Husaynis' animosity had very little to do with Finn's close relationship with the Jewish community in the city, and more with his tendency to intervene in every aspect of the city's life.
There is in fact contradicting evidence on how involved the consuls were in the city's life. Finn attributes to himself and his colleagues a large measure of involvement, but he never suffered from modesty or low self-esteem. Nonetheless, Finn personified for the notables, and particularly for the Husaynis, the evils of foreign intervention. He meddled constantly in city affairs. He complained regularly to Istanbul about the governor's close association with the 'effendis' in inciting violence against foreign visitors. On one occasion, the governor retaliated by convening an open Diwan with the notables, denouncing Finn's allegations as false. As head of the notables, Omar al-Husayni found himself in a direct clash with Finn and found it useful to elicit the French Consul, Bota, on his side. Finn protested in his dispatches to London about the French consul's disrup- tion of his efforts to mediate between warring factions in the city. Incidentally, the French consul himself was deeply involved in the domestic politics of the city, but won more sympathy from both the governor, who had a French secretary, and from most ofthe notables.
As irritating as Finn must have been, it was typical conduct on the notables' behalf to first resist the consuls, then assess how far they had been supported by Istanbul, and finally accept them as a fact of lite. During the time of Finn's predecessor, Young, the notables produced in the city an antagonist environment against foreign presence. Young reported regularly on a tacit alliance between the notables, particu- larly between the Husaynis, and the Turk- ish Garrison which led to occasional attacks on the few British residents in the city. As a result, British residents were advised not to ride alone in the Sug. Young succeeded in forcing the governor to publicly whip soldiers on one occasion - an event which stirred unrest and riots in the city against Christians. Many Muslims assembled near al-Omar Mosque chanting against the waving of Christian flags in the city. Omar al-Husayni and others urged the public to take a firmer stand against Chris- tian presence in the city.
The French consulate was attacked as it waved its flag higher than any other consulate. The unrest continued for all the summer of 1843 until the autumn of 1844. Five notables were eventually exiled under the pressure of the Europeans. We do not have their names, so we do not know whether the Husaynis were included, but we can assume that the notables as a whole felt offended by these measures, and hence Alexander Scholch may be right in assuming that this kind of European arrogance generated all over Palestine proto-nationalist consciousness aiming at blocking further foreign penetra- tion." However, at the same time, in the case of the Husaynis and other Jerusalemite families it seems that their lesson was adaptation: they learned to live with the new political actor on the scene.
The unrest in the city ended in 1844 and a new political fact was established. Within the balance of power of the city and region one had to consider now the consuls as well. The Husaynis' Yamani allegiance with the dominate lord of the rural areas, Mustafa Abu Ghosh, led them to find some affinity with French interests in the city. Finn's struggle against Abu-Ghosh's con- trol on the pilgrimage roads from Jaffa to Jerusalem, poised him in an antagonist posture towards the Husyanis.
Abu-Ghosh tried during the height of the Turkish reforms in the army to enlist disenchanted segments of the Turkish soldiery in Palestine to support his case. The reform in the Ottoman Army, initiated by Mahmud the second, led to frequent rebellions of the local garrisons all over the Middle East; particularly on payment days, which usually ended in disappointment. In Jerusalem the British consuls avoided intervening in these skirmishes and more or less remained loyal to Istanbul. The French consul, on the other hand, joined forces with the notables of the city, appointing himself as a mediator. Abu Ghosh succeeded only once in establishing such a dangerous alliance. For a while embittered soldiers sided with Abu Ghosh and the Husaynis, but retreated in the last moment before climbing on a mountain too high for them.
Mediation was the key role the Husaynis allocated for themselves on the way to regaining a paramount standing in the city. This was easier to execute after the authorities mounted a ruthless operation against Abu Ghosh in 1846, destroying for once and for all the power of this family in the Jerusalem mountains. Some of the Husaynis sided with Abu Ghosh to the last moments. Ali, the son of Omar al-Husyani, the Nagib al-Ashraf, was found with Mustafa Abu-Ghosh when the latter was caught in the punitive operation of 1846. Ali ibn Omar and Mustaf Abu Ghosh were publicly humiliated when they were pa- raded through a gathered crowds in Jaffa, after being brought from Jerusalem, on their way to a ship to be exiled outside of Palestine. This would be the last time a Husayni would find himself at loggerheads with the government, until the days of Jamal Pasha in the first world war.
Getting rid of Abu-Ghosh was a financial gain for the Ottomans, as he controlled most of the roads on the way to the city and taxed travellers, as much as it been a diplomatic asset for the consuls, as that tax had been mainly collected from Christian pilgrims. The final showdown between the central government and Abu-Ghosh in 1846 was a milestone which transformed the Husaynis' political approach. Much was to be learned from this event. It seemed that what eventually prompted the govern- ment to act was foreign pressure. The might of Europe behind the scenes was no less impressive then that on the ground, as every one learned already at the turn of the century in Egypt. The final settlement was also indicative of the continued value of the 'politics of notables', notwithstanding the new power of Europe. The Ottomans still needed the Husaynis and the Abu-Ghoshs, they had no power to impose a genuine centralized administration. Hence Mustafa Abu Ghosh and Ali al-Husayni were sent to jail in Acre, but not with hard labour. Amir Abu-Ghosh, was appointed the head of Qaryat al-A'nab (Abu Ghosh's headquarters). The governor of Jerusalem tried further to appease the notables by reducing the level of taxation, although he still reported that he saw them as a danger to the government.
After the Crimean War, the foreigner's role in the city grew even further. This was brought about by the Ottomans' search for new allies in Europe in their attempt to establish an anti-Russian coalition. The new reality was visible everywhere in the city, the first sign was the restoration of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in a festive ceremony in September 1852 (it was burned in 1850). Omar al-Husayni heard Afif Bey, a special envoy from the capital, announced 'the beginning of a new Christian phase in the history of Jerusalem'.6
During Abd al-Hamid the Second's period the principal symbol for the increasing influence of foreign powers in Jerusalem were the regal visits by Europe's leading houses, notably the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm the Second. The Husaynis, by then reinstated in their previous advantageous functions, participated in all the ceremonies, and as important members of the municipality and council took active part in the preparations, which included in many cases re-pavement of the city's roads and the installation of new illumination and water infrastructures of the city.
Although Wilhelm declared humbly in the Jerusalem churches that 'I have come only for pilgrimage purposes', the political and economic interests underlying this visit did not escape the attention of notables such as the Husaynis." How could they ignore the significance of such visits which left the city's landscape more Christian than ever before in the last 500 years? Abd al-Hamid gave Wilhelm a plot of two dunams in Mount Zion for the establish- ment of yet another church there and so a cornerstone was laid for a building which will pierce the skyline of old Jerusalem - the Dormitian Abby (its construction would be completed only in 1910). The head of the Husaynis, Ismai'l al-Husayni, encoutered the strengh of the Emperor when he was chosen to present the visitor with expensive gifts on behalf of the city's council during the Emperor's visit to Haram a-Sharif (officially still an area closed for non-Muslims, but even the Jewish philanthropist, Moses Montefiore, was invited by the Turks in the 1850s to pay a visit there).
It was indeed during the Hamidi period (1876-1908) that by sheer numbers the human panorama of the city changed. 'There are too many foreign medical practitioners in Jerusalem and a young freshman from college will find it hard to set up a practice in the country' warned the British consul in 1899.*
The foreign intervention changed the architectural face of the city as well. Economic investment by foreigners in construction, water, road and gardens infrastructures had made Jerusalem more accessible and livable for a larger number of people. In turn, however, prices, although officially under the control of the local Qadi, rose steadily reaching a peak during the Young Turk's era. In 1903, the British consul of Jerusalem. John Dickson, reported the increase of the cost of living in the city owing to its growing importance, politically and commercially. He wished obviously to justify his own request for a rise in his salary, but this report is corroborated by other sources. He was mainly, though, thinking of his official rank as too low for such a central city. He reported a doubling of the city's population, size and trade in comparison to the 1880s. He met, 'proudly everywhere in the market retail and wholesale British products' and noted with satisfaction that 'the Christian holy places are packed with British tourists in hundreds at least twice a year, in the autumn and spring'.'
Dickson was particularly delighted with the abundance of missionary building which sprang up everywhere in the city. This may have been an exaggerated picture; the consul was deprived of what was called the Jaffa Allowance which was duly transferred to the Jaffa consulate. But as mentioned it did fit with other descriptions of the city.
The consul attributed much of the change to the visit of the German Emperor in October 1898. But it seems, Wilhelm the Second's visit was only the last phase in the transformation of Jerusalem from an Ottoman town to a regional Mediterranean capital where "West met East' - a feature which remained intact until 1948 when nationalism would again transform the city this time into a battlefield between three religions and two national movements.
The final proof for the new status of Jerusalem in foreign eyes was the ranks of the local consuls. Since the Crimean War, many powers conferred the rank of consul general on their representatives in Palestine. In April 1853, France raised the leve of its consulate in the city. It became a general consulate and announced its new function as the protector of the Roman Catholics. The Austrians followed suit an became the protectors of the Patriarchate.
In 1903, the British Foreign Office was still refusing to raise the status of its consulate, although all the other European powers have already done so.
Britain was less concerned with status, and more with economic concessions, such as the one gained by the British Khedivial line running the steamship route between Egypt and Palestine. The Austrians were running the mail-service and the French ran the train system. The country's and the city's infrastructure was now built and maintained by foreign powers.
Every sphere of life was affected. The country was slowly integrated into the world economy and hence export and import increased dramatically. And with the steady grow of shipping movement in and out of the port of Jaffa, Europeans, members of all persuasions, be they religious or ideological, entered Palestine en masse and not only as individuals.
Foreign trade played a major role in introducing modern technology into agriculture. No less important were the inva- sions of new colonizers and settlers. German and Jewish immigrants brought with them new techniques and equipment, increased the production in their own farms and fields, but did not advance this knowhow into the world of the local peasants. They helped integrate the local economy into the global one, transforming the orientation of rural Palestine from subsistence crops into cash crops. This infact decreased the attractiveness of land an agriculture asset and as we shall note later, led the Husaynis to sell land rather than invest in it in agricultural production.
Local industry, on the other hand, did not transform dramatically. Foreign trade increased the need for finance and credit, from the peasant to the traders. Thus more and more branches of foreign banks were opened. The Sharia' did not allow interest, but a flexible interpretation of Islamic permission for gift exchange and grants had enabled local entrepreneurs to become bankers with religious legitimacy. With the banking came the mail and the insurance companies. This new sphere of economic activity led some of the Husaynis to venture entry into the banking world - but nonetheless they did not succeed too well. The connection to the outside world, from the family's point of view, was more crucial for its soap factory, which had already been quite famous in the beginning of the 18th century.
So Palestine was better defined and claimed, but not only by locals but also by foreigners. There is hardly any information of popular feelings manifested violently against the growing involvement of the European consuls in Jerusalem (as Scholch reports for instance in Nablus)."" One would have expected, in the case of Jerusalem, that the arrival of Christian settlers and the drive of the Anglican church to convert Jews to Christianity, by encouraging their return to the holy land, would raise the tension in the city. However, compared with Damascus where for in- stance in 1848 an anti-Christian campaign and riots was instigated, inter alia, by the foreign consuls' policies and attitudes, nothing of this scale and intensity is reported to have ever taken place in Jerusalem. It was probably due to the fact that in Jerusalem the consuls were more restrained by their governments; apart from the American consul who used to irritate the authorities and segments of the population by waving high the American flag. British consuls reported throughout the second half of the nineteenth century only a few cases in which foreigners were in danger. They did however blame the u/ama, and among them there were quite a few Husaynis for inciting the population against the Christians in the city.11 Itis however, as we shall see, important to note that the family was not one homogenous unit, and its members, such as Ismail, the head of the family during the last decades of the Ottoman rule, cultivated friendly relationship with both foreigners and Christians - a tendency that would grow during the Young Turk's era.
The place to look for the Husaynis' involvement in possible incitement of anti-foreign attitudes would be the Nabi Musa festivities. The supervision and mastering of this important festival in which the Muslims went in procession to what is believed to be Moses' tomb and stayed there for three joyful days had been entrusted in the hands of the Husaynis ever since the 18th century and probably before. Already at the end of the 19th century, the Nabi Musa ceremony became an event through which the Muslim public could express its protest against the anti-Muslim changes in the city, particularly against the involvement of the Consuls in minor and major matters concerning the community affairs and fate.
Quite often the festival coincided with Easter; a proximity of dates that became more significant with the increasing vol- ume of Christian pilgrimage to the city. Yehosua Ben-Aryeh asserts that it was the Jerusalemite governor Rauf Pasha (1876-1888) who had been the first to incite the Muslims to use Nabi Musa as an anti-Christian event.12 It is more likely, however, that the governor and his government were rather apprehensive of such an anti-Christian uprising as it could stir instability and disorder at a time when the central government was trying to pacify the Empire. This had been indeed the impression of the engineer (founder of the Palestine Exploration Fund) Claude Conder."' The Hebrew paper, Ha-havazelet, at the time blessed the Ottoman government for imposing law and order in the Nabi Musa affair. The travelogues of Francis Newton testify as well to a peaceful execution of the ceremonies. Indeed, the Turkish government must have acted here against popular feelings, shared by the Husaynis a the masters of the ceremony that Nabi Musa was celebrated in the most unfavourable conditions for the Muslims. It was the iron fist imposed by the Turks that prevented the situation form deteriorating into an all out riot.
However, the principal source of friction between foreigners and local would be the land issue, not in the same scope and intensity as it would be during the manda- tory period, but in Jerusalem in particular in led to high tensions in the city and its surrounding.
The Land Issue
The bone of contention between the notables and some of the foreign consuls was the land issue. In this sense, Alexande Shcolch's treatment of Zionism as part and continuation of Christian colonialism in th first half of the nineteenth century makes considerable sense. Even before the purchase of land was authorized by the reformers of Istanbul in 1858, we have evidence for foreign procurement of land in Jerusalem in 1850. One of the 'pioneers' in this field was James Finn. He found it difficult to function in a small house within the city's walls: 'there was no room for the servants', he complained. He set his eyes on a plot of land in Beit Safafa and encoun- tered an immediate opposition form the 'Effendie's of the city'. The notables threatened anyone selling land to Finn, with boycott and if necessary, arrest on the basis of the violation of the law. No other Consul was ever resented in such a way in Jerusalem. Finn reported the Greek-Russian church official Nikofors was behind this opposition as he wanted to secure land for his church. Nicofors was an Ottoman citizen and thus could buy land freely. Finn claimed Nicofors bribed the notables. Finn was particular Russophobic in those days and even a parade of 50 Russian navy men in the city seemed ominous to him.14
Finn alarmed his government with rumors of a Russian-Greek orthodox scheme to surround Jerusalem with plots of purchased agriculture land. He reported a rumor that every serviceman in Russia set aside a portion from his annual salary for supporting the purchase campaign in Jeusalem. It was a period of extensive purchase of land outside the city; local land owners, such as the Husaynis, benefited from the competition, but foreign interven- tion also intensified. Nonetheless, person- alities, at that stage, counted more than states and the Husaynis selected their business partners according to individual, rather than, national dislikes.
It seems that it was not the Russians who recruited the Husaynis, and other families, against Finn - it was a local initiative supported warmly by the Ottoman governor of the city. The latter started a campaign against the purchase of land by Europeans, particularly by Finn, if one were to believe Finn's own testament. The governor warned a full forum of the notables' council that a foothold in the door would lead to a complete takeover similar to the one connived by the British in India:
First there came a street sweeper earning a few paras: he inhabited an old sepulcher: then built a dome over it: than added a chamber: then wrote home to his government, who sent others: and so at last the English conquered India15
To us it might seem a description more in the line of a takeover of the Holy Sepulchre but it is quite adequate as a description of the way India became British, although from Finn's report it is not clear whether the notables supported the governor's stance. Some of them, at least, failed to see the wisdom behind his behaviour and in fact the meeting ended with the governor angrily sending off some of the notables.
The Husaynis had a vested interest in safeguarding their rights as land owners. They had become in the beginning of the 19th century property owners, probably, among the richest in the city, by being deeply involved in the process of the dismemberment of Wagqfs and as the late Gabriel Baer wrote on the families in general, 'and probably benefited considerably from the transaction in which they were involved'.16 The scope and pace of land purchase of course increased after the law had changed. But even after that it was difficult for foreigners to purchase land without the governor's and the local council's approval. But all of the actors on the Jerusalemite stage had to bow to new rules and codes invented for them by the enthusiastic reformers in Istanbul.
Ilan Pappe teaches at Haifa University.
1 Miriam Hoexter, 'The Role of Qays and Yemen
Factions in Local Political Divisions: Jabal Nablus
Compared with the Judean Hills in the First Half of the
Nineteenth Century', Asian and African Studies 9/
3(1973), pp. 301-4.
2 PRO, FO 78/1220, Jerusalem to London, 27 April
1855.
3 Firman from the Sublime Porte to al-Tayar pasha
(who was the Wali of Gaza and Jerusalem 1841),
Hazik, Majmu'at al-Muharirat, (The Collection of
Documents) doc. 27 in p. 52.
4 Arif al-Arif, Tarikh al-Quds, (Cairo, no date),
pp. 118-9.
5 Alexander Scholch, Palestine in Transformation,
1856-1882, (Washington: The Institute For Palestinian
Studies, 1992), pp. 61-77, 110-118.
6 PRO, FO 78/913, Jerusalem to London, 18 September
1852.
7 Ibrahim al-Aswad, a/-Rihla al-Imbratoriyyafi al-
Mamaliq al-Uthimaniya, (The Imperial Tour in the
Ottoman Areas),(Babda: 1898). Al-Aswad accompa-
nied the trip.
8 PRO, FO78/5352, Jerusalem to London, 20 February
1899.
9 PRO FO 78/5285, Jerusalem to London, 14 November
1903.
10 Scholch, Palestine in Transformation, pp. 267-283.
11 Sir H. Elliot to Earl of Derby on 4 January 1876 in
document 169 in British Documents on Foreign
Affairs, Series B. the Near and the Middle East. part |
vol., (London 1984).
12 Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, Jerusalem in the Nineteenth
Century; the Old City, (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi; 1980),
(Hebrew) pp. 119,134,
13 Claude Conder, Tent Work, Vol. 1, pp. 334-335,
14 PRO, FO 78/839, Jerusalem to London, 24 Septem-
ber 1850.
15 PRO, FO 78/839, 14 August 1850. There is also a
letter from Finn to the Governor, Adham Pasha in FO
78/839, 5 August 1850.
16 Gabriel Baer, 'Jerusalem's Families of Notables and
the Wakfin the Early 19th Century', in D. Kushner
(ed.), Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, (Jerusalem;
Yad Ben Zvi, 1986), p. 114
Part Il Ilan Pappe
Preface
In the final installment of his two-part article, historian Ilan Pappe continues his exploration of the "politics of notables" in Jerusalem through tracing the fortunes of the influential Al Husayni family through the Tanzimat period to the immediate aftermath of World War I. Pappe's main arguments that the "politics of notables" served the family well in confronting dramatic upheavals and even the dissolution of Ottoman Empire; the notables' code of adaptation and mediation between the local
* In this piece the standard transliteration is used, rather than the more common spelling of "Husseini"
community and the Ottoman Empire provided both legitimacy and power. However, as he notes in his introduction to Part One, this code "was not sufficient in the face of Zionism." In Part One, Pappe delineates the family's role in local conflicts in the nineteenth century, such as the long-standing Qais-Yamani rivalry, in the politics of empire and its coveted appointments, and in the navigation of the problems and conflicts posed by the rising power of the European Consuls in Jerusalem, particularly the interventionist British Consul, James Finn. Part Two opens with the impact of the Ottoman reforms on the Husaynifortunes and Strategies and ends with the Husaynis - and the rest of Palestinian society - struggling to come to grips with the Zionist movement
The Tanzimat's Impact on the Family's Fortunes
The Ottoman reforms were in essence a centralizing effort, creating in Palestine new power centers. This transformation did not bypass the Husaynis. Until the Crimean War the family largely dominated the three traditonal power bases: Mashyachat al-Haram (the Guardian of the Haram), Nigabat al-Ashraf(head of the Prophet's family), and the Mufti (head of the committee for religious qesearch and rulings). As a result of the Tanzimat, a new bastion had to be conquered: at of the Baladiya, the town council. This was done quite successfully. The mayorality fortified the family's dominance in local politics in Jerusalem from the 1860s through the Mandatory period. I stress this continuity with the family's position in the Mandatory period in order to refute the common historiographical assumption, put forward mainly by Israeli orientalists, that the British gave the Husaynis their dominant role in local politics. The British in theory had the power to rob the Husaynis of that role, but in fact decided to leave the balance of power in the city intact
The municipality in Jerusalem was established in 1863 as part of the overall effort of the Sultan, 'Abd al-Aziz the Second, to build a modern centralized state on the French model. For most of the time until the outbreak of the First World War, the Husyanis added this position to their other power bases. However, in order to gain this position, previous assets such as noble genealogy, religious piety and good connections in Istanbul were not enough. There was a need to secure the goodwill of electors, who in their turn chose the mayor. Some of the electors were Jews, a reality that generated interesting and intricate relationships between Jews and the family
The other main contenders for this position were the Khalidis. And at times, but not usually, they had the upper hand. Such was the case in 1898, when the Khalidis took the post with the help of the Jewish vote. This was a package deal and when the post was won, an array of positions could be secured to many junior members of the triumphant family. The competition according to some evidence was not too harsh and quite fair. Haim Gerber remarks, quite convincingly, that as this was the beginning of a new era, optimism and openness were the order of the day.!
' Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of'the Province ofJerusalem." in D. Kushner (ed.), Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1986), pp. 41-42
The Husaynis' control over the municipality became more continuous during the first decade of the twentieth century. The last mayor of Jerusalem before the First World War was Husayn Salim al-Husayni, who inherited the mayoralty from his father in 1910. His step-brothers, 'Abd al-Salih and Sa'id, held the posts in the years 1900 to 1906. Sa'id was also elected as a representative to the Ottoman parliament and hence personified the way that new positions emerging in the Tanzimat period were added to the traditional power bases of the family
The successful adaptation of the family to the new political reality did not mean that it sided with the Tanzimat. The family is recorded as opposing the process in principle, unlike other families such as the Khalidis who supported the reforms and hence were granted a dominant role by the authorities in the power bases of the city in the 1840s and early 1850s. As long as the Husaynis's strong ties with the rebellious Abu Ghosh clan were intact in this period, the family's antagonistic attitude eroded their position in the city and they lost positions such as the Mufti and the Mashyachat al-Haram
But the lean years were soon over and the family's fortunes improved again in the aftermath of the Crimean War. The first indication was in 1856 when the Husaynis returned to the Ifia (the committee headed by the Mufti). The Mufti Fadhal 'Abdullah Jarallah died and was replaced by Mustafa al-Husayni, the grandfather of Haj Amin. The shift in their fortunes was made possible due to the good relationship cultivated with the Ottoman governor of Damascus and probably more importantly, the strong ties the family had with the Jarallahs. Mustafa al-Husayni remained in office until 1893 and his son, Shaykh Taher, replaced him. Mustafa's son from his first wife Mahbuba, Kamil, replaced his father in 1908, and Amin, his son from his second wife, Zainab, became the grand Mufti after the British occupation in 1921
The pragmatism imbedded in the "politics of notables" smoothed the family's adaptation to the major feature of the Tanzimat - centralization - that seemed to threaten the positions of Arab notables all over the empire. Antagonism was turned into acquiescence and eventually support for the new era and its spirit. We will note a similar tendency during the Young Turk's time and even the first years of the Mandate, tendencies that did not persevere due to the Young Turks' Turkifization policy and the pro-Zionist stance of the Mandatory powers
Benefits of Centralization: The Sanjaq of Jerusalem
Once the Husaynis dissociated themselves from the rural lords around them, they discovered the benefits of a tighter regime. Centralization did not only clip the wings of the rural lords, it also crippled the power of the regional capital, Damascus, The decline in Damascus' fortunes had benefited to a large extent those living in Jerusalem. More concretely, the administrative reforms had upgraded the status of the city. It became the center of an autonomous Sanjaq in 1872, Abu Ghosh and the other Mashyachat of the mountains were no longer a credible social or political force when the Sanjaq was created. The urban families were the only members of the local elite to partake in the enlarged political sphere offered by Ottoman reforms
The creation of the autonomous Sanjaq was the peak of the centralization effort, rather than the result of the European pressure on Istanbul, as is sometimes attributed. As Butros Abu Maneh rightly noted:
New challenges facing the Ottoman period during this century aroused the need for the reinforcement of Ottoman rule in the area. Consequently the sanjaks [sic] of Jerusalem and Gaza acquired a renewed importance for the Ottoman authorities.2
These new challenges were primarily the Wahabis's control of Mecca and Medina, wresting the holiest cities from the Sultan's hand; the need to counterbalance them dictated increasing the religious importance of Jerusalem
The new Sanjaq transformed Palestine into a more well-defined geo-political unit; its former ecclesiastical boundaries crystallized into political borders. The road from this geopolitical event into a deeper sense of self- determination among the notables, such as the Husaynis, passed through another catalytic event, which acted to exclude Palestinians from the Empire. This event was the Young Turk's revolution
Coping with the New World of the Young Turks: From the Politics of Notables to the Politics of Nationalism
The Husaynis were quite amazing in the way they adapted to the new reality created by the 1908 coup. This was partly due to the
1 Butrus Abu Maneh, "The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late Nineteenth Century" in Gabriel Ben Dor (ed.), The Palestinians and the Conflict (Haifa: Haifa University, 1982), p. 21
fact that for them it was indeed a coup and not a revolution, as it would seem to the historian many years later. From Jerusalem, the despotism of the new rulers of Istanbul was neither different - nor better - than that of the Hamidian regime. The difference was that the new despotism was challenged by a modern response: Arab nationalism. In order to survive as a leading socio-political force in the city and in the new Sanjaq, the family had to grasp the new ideology and become a principal vehicle for its promotion
The Young Turk revolution went through two major phases in its relationship with the Arab national movement. The first phase, up to 1912, was quite positive. Jerusalem responded, from above and below, with what seemed to be genuine expressions of approval for the new regime as well as a sincere joy at the fall of the Hamidian police state. The popular demonstrations in the streets of Jerusalem during the first months of the revolution were partly orchestrated and partly spontaneous. Husaynis who were teenagers at the time remember the period as one in which school children were recruited to participate in ceremonies welcoming the new regime. Tawfiq and Hilmi, the sons of Musa Qazim, were recruited to one such street theater, which celebrated the new dawn.3 The elders of the family held the most prominent positions in the city and therefore could not shun a central role on the local stage. It is difficult in hindsight to reconstruct their basic attitudes towards the new rulers
3 1zzat Tanus, al-Filastiniyyun: Madi Majid wa- Mustagbal Bahir (The Palestinians: A Noble Past and A Glorious Future), (Beirut: PLO 1982), p. 24 and Muhammad [zzat Darwazah, Mudhakirat wa-Tsjilat (Memoirs and Notes), (Damascus: 1984), Vol. 1, p. 174
They could have felt offended when they learned that the new government chose Jaffa as the venue for its official inauguration in Palestine, or they could have felt relief, not to be immediately recruited by the new administration, given their very solid and loyal relationship with the Ottoman emperors. In any case it was up to Jerusalem's mayor, Salim al-Husayni, to conduct the official ceremonies, or Baya' for the secular regime. His first act was to convene the city's officials and notables and address them, while standing in front of heavy framed picture with the logo "The Committee of Union and Progress," the name chosen by the Young Turks for the only legitimate party in the Empire. The family thus went through the motions and one can only guess their deeper feeling about the end of more than four hundreds years of Ottoman rule - or indeed whether they perceived this dramatic conclusion of an historical era.4
Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood? The Fate of Shuqri Al Husayni
We can read the local newspapers read by the Husaynis at the time. These papers were full of praise for the coup and expressed hopes for a better life under the new rulers. The press did not, however, serve as a debating stage for the notables. But we do know that among the Husaynis there were differences of opinion on how best to approach the new regime. The dissension was between those advocating the adoption of an anti-Turkish version of local nationalism and between
4 Walid al-Khalidi, Qabl al-Shitat, al-Tarikh al- Musawar Iil Sh'ab al-Filastini, 1876-1948 (Before the Diaspora: A Pictorial History of the Palestinian People), (Beirut: PLO 1987), picture no. 7
those advising cooperation with the new ruler. Such discord was beyond the common debates typical to the "politics of notables." These were by all accounts most difficult times for the family
Ten days after the coup took place, one section of the Husaynis sided with the revolution. It was led by Shuqri al-Husayni, the brother of Ismail, the official head of the family and an official of the highest rank accessible to an Arab in the Ottoman administration. Shuqri was also a senier official. He was the head accountant in the Ministry of Education in Istanbul for a long period (1888-1907) and held the prestigious title of Pasha. It was Shuqri who directed the pro-revolutionary festivities in the city. As Khalil al-Sakakini noted in his diary, these festivities were the first ever Muslim- Christian demonstrations of solidarity in the city and thus, unwittingly, the pro-Turkish feelings helped to cement Arab nationalism
This paradoxical development was manifested in another activity of Shuqri. He was one of the founding fathers of an Arab- Ottoman solidarity group. This group would become, again inadvertently, the first national organization in Jerusalem daring to oppose Turkish rule. Although Shuqri himself remained loyal to the Young Turks and was not easily "Arabized," he nonetheless died an Arab martyr. He finally came out openly against the new regime when it declared its intention to Turkifize the Arab provinces. Against this initiative, Shuqri positioned himself as an Ottoman-Arab, which was enough for the Turks to charge him with treason. He would have been executed, had he not died due to the inhuman way he was treated on the way to his military trial. His convoy stopped for the night in Hamah, on the way to Aleppo, but he never made it to the morning after.5
Arab historiography, like any other national historiography, tends to nationalize, indiscriminately in Benedict Anderson's words, every event in the past. Thus, the Arab-Ottoman solidarity group has been appropriated, as were Shuqri's deeds, as precursors of Arab nationalism. The Arab- Ottoman group was in fact an embryo or proto-national formation, but its founder wished it be something else.6 For Shugqri, it wasa channel for integrating the family and the society into the new political order; indeed, the solidarity group was soon called the party of Arab-Ottoman brotherhood and was in effect a branch of the ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress. Some argue that "Ottoman" was added to the union's title out of fear of the Young Turks' wrath, and yet one may accept that Shuqri and his friends were genuinely taken by the new revolutionary ideas. It was probably, as the union's platform stated, a sincere effort to preserve Arab culture within the political Turkish structure. The union's platform was concise and simple: it accepted the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, it respected the Empire's territorial integrity, it called for the improvement of economic and social conditions in the Arab provinces on an equal basis with the rest of the Empire's other peoples and demanded further extension of Arabic education in Arabic those areas.7
5 Muhammad Al-Dabagh, Biladuna, Vol. 10, part 2, ibid, pp. 369-370.
6 Ajaj Nuhayd, "Rajul min Filastin: Khalil Sakakini" (A Man from Palestine: Khalil Sakakini), Filastin, 12 July 1955.
7 Amin Sa'id, al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra (The Great Arab Revolt), (Cairo, no date and no publishing house), Vol. 1, pp. 7-8
In fact, in 1908, Shuqri al-Husayni's major concern was the fate of the Empire, not that of Palestine. He spent much of the time in organizing petitions and demonstration in Jerusalem, responding to news of the declining fortunes of the Empire in the Balkans. Thus, for instance, the population of Jerusalem was asked to send petitions against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. Shuqri instigated a boycott of the fashionable Tarbush, of Austrian make, as part of this show of discontent (the tarbush, a red felt cap with a silk tassel, was most popular among the notables.) 8
For one brief moment in the winter of 1908, it seemed as if Shuqri al-Husayni succeeded in stirring the family to a co-operative course with the new regime and adaptation to the new world created by the "Young Turks." Shugqri prodded the family to participate in parliamentary life, even under the new regime. A month after the suspended constitution of 1876 was readopted, Istanbul issued new orders about an election campaign for a new parliament (one representative for each Mutasarifiyya with 50,000 inhabitants). This meant that the Sanjaq of Jerusalem was offered three seats. Every man above 25 voted for a group of electors who in turn chose the three delegates. Ruhi al-Nashashibi, was elected, along with two Husaynis (Sa'id and Salim) who rotated the seat, and a representative of Jaffa from the al-Dajani family
Enlisting Ismail and the Erasure of "Ottoman"
Shuqri succeeded in enlisting the support of the head of the family, Ismail al-Husayni to the Arab-Ottoman initiative. This was not an easy task, given Ismail's reputation as one of the most loyal notables to the Hamidian regime. He must have felt less confident than his brother. The new regime in Istanbul started a purge against all those who were suspect of having been the last Sultan's confidantes and agents. The new regime asserted that quite a few of the Palestine notables had been in a contact with the "Hafiye," the Sultan's secret police. According to Izzat Darwaze's memoirs, it were eventually the notables of Nablus who were the principal suspects, and not those of Jerusalem.9 When these apprehensions were allayed, Ismail gave his blessing to the new organization.
What induced Ismail was a simultaneous consent by his friends and one of the most important dignitaries in the city, Ghalib al-Khalidi, to join he initiative. Ghalib had a special status as he had been the person who informed the people of Jerusalem about the revolution. It was expected that Rauf Pasha, the governor, would be the one to announce the event, but his antagonistic relationship with the notables led him to assume erroneously that such a move would lead to a rebellious mood among the city's notables. Ghalib was a distinguished member of the regional court and a member in the educational council, whose head was Ismail.10
9 Ibid, p. 171.
10 Khalil al-Sakakini, Kadha Ana Ya Dunya (Such am I, Oh world), (Beirut: PLO 1984), entry from 12 November 1908
But Shuqri, Ghalib and Ismail were soon to find out that their admiration for the idea of Arab-Ottomanism was not reciprocated by the government of Istanbul. Domestic unrest, instigated by followers of the former sultan and several successive national uprisings led to a firm Turkifization policy by the three people who took over the leadership from the early, more liberal, coalition of Young Turks. Arab intellectuals, including members of the Arab-Ottoman solidarity groups now had to make a choice. On August 23, 1909 the Turkish government issued a decree prohibiting the establishment of political groups based on ethnic or national identity or carrying a name to such an effect. The term Ottoman was also erased and replaced by the only valid term allowed: Turkish. Many Arab activists decided to choose Arab identity and organized secretly in national societies, which would be the basis for the development of the pan-Arabist national idea
Teachers of Arab Nationalism: Sakakini, Nahleh and Baidas
But it took more than an anti-Arab policy by the Young Turks, or youthful enthusiasm, to breathe life into the embryonic national movement. It is commonplace, ever since Antonious published his monumental work, to attribute the role of modernization agents to the American missionaries, who transmitted the concept of modem nationalism from its birthplace in America: to the Arab world. This is probably still valid" as a theory today. However, in the case of the young generation of the Husaynis, it was® Arab Christian teachers who in fact "nationalized" the family. Three names come to mind in particular: Khalil al-Sakakini, Zureik Nahleh and Khalil Baidas. These three men would influence a whole generation of young Muslims and Christians in Palestine. The most prominent among them was the Lebanese Nahleh, an Anglican who directed the English College on Mt. Zion and educated the Husaynis from the end of the Hamidian period. He had a colloquium for modern Arabic in his house and is rightly considered as one of the greatest scholars of the Arabic language in the 20th century. A particular bond was struck with al- Sakakini, who was himself a student of Nahleh.!! After the revolution of 1908, al- Sakakini opened the National Constitutional School in which he tried to cultivate Arabic language and heritage. He worked intensively and enthusiastically for the Orthodox church, butalso entertained wider loyalties to the idea of a Palestinian nation.
After the revolution, the family ties with these three teachers strengthened. Nahleh and al-Sakakini were particularly respectful of the mayor Salim al-Husayni, and taught all his children.'? It was this triumvirate that in the autumn of 1908 met in a coffee house, owned by the Greek Ansti, to discuss the new concept of a Muslim-Christian association. This occasion would be the basis for Palestinian nationalism in the early years of the British Mandate. The three Christian teachers must have felt that this particular branch of the family, the secular branch ina fashion, was not in line with some of the Ulama of Jerusalem, including several Husaynis, who wished to create a national Arab society on a purely Muslim basis
11 Tanus, al-Filastinivyun, p. 54.
12 Sakakini, ibid, 21 September 1908
The Husayni Family Faces New Challenges New Alliances and the Nationalism of Notables
Another component in the development of national conciousness was a transformation of the inter-family relationships in the city. We have already mentioned the close relationship between Ghalib al-Khalidi and Ismail al-Husayni. This indicated new alliances in the city which would form the basis of what one may call the nationalism of notables.
Ever since the appointment of Ghalib to the educational council, under Ismail's chairmanship, the Khalidis and the Husaynis moved closer to each other. These were the two most important families in the city, formerly arch-rivals (for instance the Husaynis led the Yamani faction in the Jerusalem area and the Khalidis, the Qaisi.) The hatchets were buried now; with the past forgotten, a new partnership was formed, which served the two families throughout the Mandatory period.
As important as the two families might have been, their links were not enough to unite them. For a politics of nationalism to develop, a wider coalition of families was needed which accepted some form of hegemony and hierarchy. However, this acceptance was not easy to reach, which is one, but not the only, explanation for the fragility of the Palestinian national movement during the Mandatory years. When the Nashashibis decided to dissent and form their own coalition, the basis of the whole national movement became shakier. The Husaynis on their part never really accepted to be just primus inter pares and strove to concentrate the political, and above all the financial power, in the hands of one family. Thus an aspiring family, such as the Nashashibis, could not be induced, apart from the very early stages of the national history, to co-operate with the new coalition. Regardless, the early seeds of nationalism were planted with relative ease in the Husayni political field; however, as noted previously, not without causing some dissent within the family. It was mainly a generational divide. If Shugri al-Husayni presented the elders' tendency to go along with the powers to be, his nephew Jamil al-Husayni, represented the younger one.
A New Generation
Jamil, like other members of a younger generation, was in Istanbul as a student when the revolution broke out. Like other Arab students of higher education institutions in Istanbul, he was one of the first to raise the banner of nationalism and challenge the idea of Arab-Ottoman solidarity. The enthusiastic students took it upon themselves to build a network of branches all over the Arab provinces in order to promote the idea of Arab nationalism, or at least foment solidarity against the Turkifization policy. The antagonism was not only nationalist, it was democratic, as it based the Arab demands on the demographic majority the Arabs enjoyed in the Empire (roughly two thirds of the overall population).
Jamil was introduced to this new venture by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, an Arab intellectual who had founded in 1909 the secret organization, al-Fatah, ("Arab Youth"), a society which acted under the cover of an Arabic literary club in the Turkish capital, the famous al-Mundata al-Adabi (the Literary Club). The Mundata was conducted as a cultural club where literature and poetry were discussed and read - an activity allowed by the Turks. Jamil was one the first members of that club and immediately joined its secret activities. al-Fatah was the first group demanding the liberation of the Arab provinces from the Turkish yoke of occupation. For some reason the secret police was never able to expose their true activity. When Jamil returned to Palestine, he maintained the same structure of public and secret activity.
Sa'id al-Husayni was probably the only one among the middle-aged generation who supported the younger members of the family. According to one testimony it was in his house that the returning young Husaynis met other young notables to discuss their next steps as members of the new nationalist movement." Sa'id joined the al-Fatah group and became an active member in it, poising himself in direct confrontation with the government in Istanbul.
The "politics of notables," however, required a middle ground between opposition and surrender. The good old tactics were best manifested in the conduct of Musa Qazim, another member of the "secular branch" of the family. Musa Qazim had a brilliant and astonishing career in the provincial Turkish administration. He was a Mutasarifof Hawaran and later of Muntfiq in Iraq. Upfo the outbreak of the First World War, he supported, but not enthusiastically, the positions of Shuqri and Ismail, who belonged to the same branch. It is difficult, however, to describe him as a conservative. Siding with the Young Turks was, in part, siding with development and modernization which could revolutionize the lives of notables such as
13 Darwazah, ibid, p. 181
himself. He was more exposed to the rasion d'etre behind secularization, and in fact was infected by the Young Turks' modernizing zeal. After the war, he embraced fully the nationalist option, but not before. And when he chose that option, he replaced Ismail as head of the family.
Attitudes Towards the West
The opposing views of Sa'id and Shuqri towards Istanbul's policy led them to different views of British involvement in the Middle East and Palestine. Shuqri echoed eagerly the anti-British twist of Egyptian nationalism, particularly the one preached by Mustafa Kamal, who had associated pro-Ottomanism with the struggle against British occupation. Sa'id, on the other hand, was an Anglophile who spoke impeccable English, which he had learned in the American Colony in Jerusalem. He saw the British as potential allies of Arab nationalism, as indeed would many other leading activists in the pan-Arabist movement.
Itis quite difficult to reconstruct the attitude of the young Husaynis to the "West." Izzat Tanus, a co-pupil of many of the Husaynis in 8t. George School, and a young teacher there since 1911, tells candidly in his memoirs that any clear-cut analysis would miss the complexity of that attitude." If education is any yardstick for measuring Western influence, than it would be safe to assert that the youngsters received a "European education." The school curriculum towards the end of the Turkish rule was European and was well received by some of the students. If parental or domestic socialization is a
14 Tanus, ibid, p. 17
gauge, then one may, paradoxically, connect positive attitudes with the level of the parents' national consciousness - parents sympathetic to Arab nationalism were also more sympathetic to the West, while the more Ottomanist parents would criticize Europe and its culture. "Europeans" for most of the Husaynis were the consuls in town, and there was very little in the latter's conduct and relationship with the family that inspired confidence in them or in what they represented, be it European policy or culture.
All in all, one wonders how deep was the politicization among the teenagers. Like young men everywhere else then (and now), they were enthusiastically in favor of one particular Western import - football. However, there was one exception, the teenager Muhammed Amin. He did not join the football games and was quite reclusive and kept to himself, reading about politics and religion. Nobody paid any particular attention to this young, somewhat ecstatic, youth. It was only his mother, Zainab, who took a keen interest in the boy's career. When he expressed his wish to pursue a political career in Istanbul, his mother convinced Amin's elder and half-brother, Kamil, to dissuade him from taking this course. Kamil was the Mufti and must have realized that if Amin took a theological course he would be one of the possible candidates to inherit his post after his death. He agreed to direct Amin towards a more religious career. Ironically, religion would turn Amin into a pure politician. Thus, with the brother's blessing, Zainab took her son on a Haj to Mecca in 1913 and then sent him to al-Azhar to study under the auspices of the great Rashid Rida, the spiritual godfather of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, in Dar al-D'awa.
Amin was sent together with his cousin, Yaqub, to Cairo where he studied theology and Arabic. He had long evenings in Rida's house. He also went to evening classes in Kuliyat al-Adab in the University of al-Azhar. He was deeply impressed by Rida's call for the integration of Arab nationalism and Islam as the only feasible potent force against the West. However, he also learmned in Cairo the complexity of the Western impact on the Arab world. Rida taught the young Amin of the importance of Western technological achievements and political systems. Under Rida's influence, Amin established his first national organization for the sake of Palestine. Together with his roommate, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Alami, he rounded up about twenty Christians and Muslims to arouse the national consciousness against Zionism."" The society did not last for long and disintegrated as the war broke out.
Spheres of Influence: Beirut, Jerusalem
Each individual member of the family absorbed and digested the European influence in a different manner with different consequences. Much depended on the age and place in which each member found himself in the dramatic period between the coup of 1908 and the outbreak of the war. The young members of the family made their ways to different centers in the empire where they were exposed to the new Ottoman thought and methods, as well as to Western ideas and customs. In these places, young Husaynis internalized and articulated the new
15 Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Haj Amin al- Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 8-9. 62
currents of change and Europeanization, processes that facilitated the relatively calm passage of the family into the new and dramatic phase of the British occupation. Amin's cousin, Jamal al-Husayni, a leading Palestinian leader in the Mandatory period spent his formative youthful years as a medical student in the Protestant College in Beirut since 1912. In the College, he was exposed not only to medical expertise but also to national ideologues such as Butrus al- Bustani and Nasif Al-Yasghi who were among the College's teachers. Given that most of his other teachers were Americans and Canadians, we may say that he was more exposed than anyone in the family to Western influence.
Beirut provided a different outlet for the more intellectually inclined Husaynis such as Ishaq Musa al-Husayni. Ishaq was captivated by the cosmopolitan atmosphere of the city which proved an ideal surrounding for an autodidact like himself. By mere reading and contemplation, he chose the intellectual route to the changing world of tomorrow. This path was thought to be far too extreme as it came at the expanse of the collective good of the family and, very typically, he soon found himself outside the boundaries of the Middle East
It was in fact not necessary for the youngest Husaynis to leave Jerusalem in order to play a role in keeping the family's position and stature in the changing world of the Middle East. Local education also provided knowledge in European languages and culture and childhoods were spent in a neighborhood where consuls, missionaries, and Christian friends, such as Khalil Al Sakakini, were regular visitors to the family's house.
The elder generation was also attracted to European ideas and influence, but unlike the younger generation this did not lead to espousal of the politics of nationalism. A fine example was Ismail al-Husayni, the head of the family. Ismail, whose main activity was in the realm of education, was largely responsible for the transformation of the educational system in Jerusalem. However, he did not seem to be interested in nationalist education and withdrew gradually from politics and persisted in his recluse until the end of his life in 1945. Others in the family who had enjoyed a prestigious career under the Ottoman system followed suit.
In the final analysis we can say that most of the Husaynis were not, cognitively or emotionally, anti-Western and were not overcharged by nationalism. They tackled nationalism, as they had tackled in the past the invasion of foreign consuls in their life, the introduction of hostile Ottoman centralizing reforms during the Tanzimat period (1840-1876) and the young Turks. They tested the possibility of opposing these phenomena and then adapted to their inclusion. In a similar way, they treated the emergence of a national discourse and ideology in their environment. It was a development, towards which in the very beginning they showed a considerable indifference. Nationalism as a dogma or a position did not bring economic and financial benefits for them, but on the other hand, it was not a threatening development as it did not challenge the perks offered by the Turkish world. It had no socialist or communist message in it and in the microcosm of Jerusalem, before the Watan of Palestine was recognized as such, it had little impact on their life. Typically, however, they were not induced during the first months of the war to side against the national movement, in a counter-organization offered by Jamal Pasha, the Turkish ruler of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, not even when this invitation was accompanied by threats
It was the younger generation who showed greater enthusiasm for nationalism. As students, they were more easily drawn into the radical and intriguing world of Arab nationalism. It was mainly the Husayni students in Istanbul who were, like younger people all over the world at the time, drawn into the whirlwind of this new gripping and global idea of national identity, translating it, or rather localizing it, in the face of the Turkish reality, at first, and then the British one.
The young generation ensured a leading role for the Husaynis in the national movement. The rest of the family would join forces when the First World War ended both the Turkish rule and the Ottoman world as they knew it. The relative late entrance of the family, as a whole, into the business of nationalism left them quite handicapped vis- a-vis the vigorous combination of nationalism and colonialism exercised by the Zionists.
Zionism before the Young Turk revolution
Where does the Zionist phenomenon enter or intervene in the family's perception of the social and political reality of the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century? The elder generation seems to have taken the Zionist threat more seriously. However, they lacked the national framework that was the appropriate prism to understand and confront this challenge. National ideology fired the imagination of the young Jews who had come to settle in Palestine and uproot its local population. To defend themselves, and more importantly their society, the Huysanis, and the notables in general, needed to generate a similar energetic response.
The majority of the Jews arriving in the Sanjaq of Jerusalem since 1882 were Austrians, Russian and Americans. The consuls of these countries facilitated the entrance of these Jews despite the Turkish government's principled opposition to such immigration (in general, the Austrians were less helpful than the rest). The Turkish government opposed immigration from the very outset of the Zionist movement. Already in 1882 a decree prohibiting Jewish immigration had been proclaimed, but it was revised in 1889, under the consuls' pressure, to allow a three-month stay for pilgrimage purposes only. However, two years later, again the Ottoman government tried to limit the immigration by prohibiting large groups from entering. Small groups were allowed to stay only one year.
An even harsher line was taken at the turn of the century, when Istanbul once more revised its policy on Jewish immigration. In 1900 the Turks sent a request to steam-liner companies to cooperate with them in preventing immigration. In the same year, Article 2 of a new law stipulated that any Jew staying more then three months would be expelled. The tendency of Istanbul to restrict Jewish immigration did not operate well in the case of British Jews, as they were the only ones whose passports did not mention their Jewish origin. Furthermore, the British consuls in the area were most reluctant to expel British subjects of any origin. And so the emancipatory virtues of Britain helped the Jews who had lost faith in the possibility of their assimilation as equals in Europe to emigrate to Palestine
Zionism and the Family Agenda
Zionism occupied the family's agenda, since it had interests that were not strictly limited to the clan's life. Its social standing required some sort of public reaction, transcending the family's narrow interests. The family's political and social status depended on the Muslim or at least Arab nature of Jerusalem and of Palestine as a whole (less cynical historians would even talk about concern for the fate of the society or the nation). Until 1908, this interest was scant. The position of each member of the family dictated the appropriate response; hence, the Mufti was the most active in expressing resistance to Zionism. As part of his duty, he was constantly asked for official reaction to Jewish immigration. Later, however, when the national conscience was in the possession of almost every member of the elite, these differences would hardly exist, Zionism for all became a colonialist movement based on European imperialism, attracting a growing number of Jews to Palestine, purchasing land and assets at an alarming pace, and who were determined to wrest Palestine from the Palestinians. Yet around 1908 none of the people involved in the Zionist movement, or those opposing it, knew how it would develop and what would be its "real" essence. At the time it was an integral part of other European colonial initatives in Palestine (the most successful of which were the Templars).
Like the Zionists themselves, the Husaynis could not yet distinguish between fantasy and reality. At a time that witnessed such persons as a self-proclaimed prince named Immanuel, who came to Jerusalem in July 1904 and enthroned himself as the new leader of the Jews, it is understandable why some viewed Herzl in a similar way. However, the establishment of the first seven Zionist settlements in Palestine did rouse the population through the press, although more the newspapers coming from Cairo and Beirut than the local press.
The family began to treat the phenomenon more seriously probably when the local press did so. In 1910, the paper al-Karmil started publishing excerpts from Theodore Herzl's manifesto, "The Jewish State." The Husaynis were divided between Sa'id, who was fiercely anti-Zionist (we have some of his proclamations in the Parliament, through the Arabic press), and Husayn, the mayor. The latter, like his father Salim, was appointed to his position with the help of the Jews, the largest group in the city. It was the "Society of Jewish Ottomans," headed by Dr. Levi, the Director of the Palestine Bank that elicited Jewish support for his appointment. Hence, alhough Husayn was also temporarily a parliament member, he did not echo the sentiments of Sa'id.
Rumors and Realities: Questions in Parliament
An informative source for all the notable families in Jerusalem was the Damascene parlamentarian, Shuqri al-Asali. He for instance presented a query to the Ottoman Parliament about the precise number of Jews in the Sanjag of Jerusalem. The government talked about 100,000 (al-Asali estimated them to be 85,000.)". Al-Asali was a firm believer in the rumors appearing in the Arab press about Zionist diplomatic skills. They were suspected as moving behind the scene of the Young Turks. The source of these rumors seems to have been Arab students in Istanbul. Prominent among them were two Husaynis: Jamil, whom we have already mentioned and who was of the Hasani Branch (i.e. the more religious branch), and Mustafa Nafiz, of the Tahiri, more secular branch. Jamil and Mustafa helped to organize their colleague to act against the Zionist purchase of land and immigration into Palestine. It was the prestigious a/-4hram that first gave credence to these rumours about Zionist influence in Istanbul. A leading article was republished again and again titled "The Zionists in the Turkish Parliament"; its most severe allegation was that the Shaykh al-Islam, Jawdat Pasha, was a converted pro-Zionist Jew. Similar suspicions were directed at Talat Pasha, the interior minister. 17
On May 16, 1911, Sa'id raised for the first time in the parliament the Palestine question and claimed: "The Jews intend to establish a state in the area, which will include Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia." In response Khalil Bey, the Interior minister, informed the house thathis government opposed Zionism and that Sa'id was making unjustified allegations.18
Sa'id's anti-Zionist stance was not easily forged. Sa'id had been sent by his father to attend the Jewish Alliance School. He was taught Hebrew there, a proficiency that secured him a position in the local censorship office.
16 Mahmud Hasa Salih Mansa, Tarikh al-Sharg al- "Arabi al-Hadith (The History of the Modern Arab East), (Beirut, 1984), p. 150.
17 Al-Ahram, 15 March 1911, 7 February 1913.
18 Neville Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism before World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 112-113
For months he scrutinized daily the Hebrew press, published mainly in Jerusalem. Sa'id must have been ambivalent, even after he made his vociferous objections to Zionism in the Parliament. When reproached by former Jewish class mates for his views on Zionism- of which they read in the Hebrew press-he tried to mitigate their fears by claiming that it was all done for the sake of public opinion. To be more precise, he needed the votes of Jewish electors to be re-elected to the parliament. It was difficult to reconstruct Ismail's views on Zionism. He had a cordial, at times a genuinely friendly relationship with the Jewish community. In 1909 he tried to open with Jewish partners a Commercial Bank in Jerusalem, an enterprise that failed because of strong Turkish objection.
This whole analysis of the attitude towards Zionism should not be analyzed retrospectively and we should be careful to assume in hindsight that the subject must have been one of the family's highest priorities. The years 1908-1914 had brought with them endless worries and concerns-some of a dramatic nature, some quite mundane. Indeed, the locust invasion in 1910 may have seemed more threatening than the Zionist invasion, as the Husaynis owned by then quite a lot of land. Such a natural disaster affected it economically to a considerable extent. This was quite an horrendous attack, which filled the houses in the city with hordes of dead insects. The authorities promised compensation for anyone presenting them with a sack full of the dead enemies.
There were persons in Palestine who were totally committed to challenging the Zionist threat, but they were mainly Christians in those days. When the Turkish paper in Arabic, al-Mufid, criticized the Wujahaa (the notables) of al-Quds for not contributing their share to the advancement of the reforms, Najib Nasar's paper Al-Karmil responded by an editorial article titled: "The Arab Palestinian League." "We Palestinians," argued Nasar, "have nothing in common with the Beirutis. We do not share the same economic and social predicament." Nasar suggested to the notables of Jerusalem and other cities that they establish a "Palestinian League" that would co-ordinate the elite's efforts vis-a-vis Zionism and defense of the Watan (the homeland) instead of the reforms.'" The antagonistic attitude to the reforms was there; whether it was replaced by nationalism as Nasar wanted it, is quite doubtful. In any case, one person, the Turkish governor, Akram Bey, was convinced that the notables, and particularly the Husaynis, devoted all their energy to undermining the government's reform. Indeed, this was the important divide in late Ottoman Palestine: supporting or rejecting the new reality created by the Young Turks, not by the Zionists.
However, any antagonism between Akram Bey and the Husaynis did not lead to anti- Turkish sentiment in the family's policy. Hence, in the years leading to the Great War, the Husaynis acted against Zionism within the framework of the political Turkish institutions such as the parliament or the city, as well as the regional councils. For that reason, one can assume a clear distinction in the minds of the Husaynis, active in the matter of Zionism, between the settlers and the residential veteran Jewish community of Jerusalem. This explains the limited nature of the reaction against Zionism. With some Jewish and Christian families, the Husaynis enjoyed a fair and
19 Al-Karmil, no. 336, 3 September 1913, p. 1
cordial relationship. Their efforts on behalf of these families during the mainly anti-Christian terror imposed by Jamal Pasha during the war in the city testify to the intimacy in the relationship. At times these efforts were carried out at a considerable risk to the individuals involved.
The tendency to cope with Zionism through the institutions of the powers that be continued to a certain degree after the British occupation. The younger generation, which took over the family's leadership, returned in a way to the "politics of notables." Their legitimacy was based on their religious and national status, recognized by both their society and the Mandatory power. Colonial support was thus seen as crucial for maintaining both the family's stature and for challenging the Zionist threat. In this sense, Haj Amin al-Husayni deviated from the preaching of his tutor, Rashid Rida, who advocated uncompromising anti-colonialist struggle. Neither, it seems, did the mass anti-British resistance in Egypt in July 1919 erode the family's trust in its ability to move the British Mandate on a pro-Palestinian course. But when the Mandate was officially established in June 1920 and a pro-Zionist Jew was appointed as the High Commi-ssioner, at least some of the family, such as Musa Qazim, developed serious doubts about Albion's loyalty. His suspicions were aroused when the new rulers extricated some of the most important official ranks from the family's hands and gave them to British, Jewish and rival families.
This failure does not necessarily indicate that the Husaynis, to use modernizing jargon, were traditionalists.' The conventional Mandatory historiography juxtaposes the modern and revolutionary Zionists with the 'traditional' Arab leadership. If one examines this dichotomy from within the Husaynis' history, it seems that the family's leadership in the early years of the Mandate was rebellious and young, headed by a youngster in his early twenties who challenged the traditional heads of the family.
This challenge is the real watershed in the family's history, and it had begun long before the British Occupation. The occupation was indeed a dramatic juncture in the history of Palestine, but the Young Turk Revolution was traumatic to many elder members of the family. The young generation adapted itself successfully to the changes brought by the young Turks, and even to the transformation of Palestine by the British authorities, as did young generations all over the Arab world. However none of the Husaynis' peers in the Arab world had to cope with the burden of solving the Jewish problem in Europe.
The history of the family thus changed in the years 1840 to 1922, through a long process in which many young members of the family in each generation internalized the transformations around them - and exploited these processes as well. The successes and failures were due to the educational transformation of the young Husaynis on the one hand, and the family's tradition of survival, on the other. Both his educational background and the family's "politics of notables" brought Haj Amin al-Husayni to the presidency of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1922; an event which was in a way the apex of this process. But, in the following years the inadequacy of the skills acquired in both the educational system and in the "politics of notables" became only too clear when the family had to face the Zionist movement in earnest.
Ilan Pappe teaches at Haifa University