Behind the Silken Curtain - Bartley C. Crum
An American from the Midwest, Crum was one of the members of the UNSCOP Commission
Page 165: It was instructive to meet Katie Antonius, widow of George Antonius, author of The Arab Awakening, who had been the outstanding interpreter of Islam to the Western world. I lunched with Mrs. Antonius in the residence of the Mufti, where she was then living - at that time he was still in France - and learned that she had two great obsessions: Communism and Zionism. Germany, she felt, had been wronged. She did not conceal her sympathy with the German cause. It was obvious that she, like so many other intellectuals of the Middle East, had little faith in the democratic processes. Easterners had been brought up to distrust the masses and they had no faith in the common man. The Mufti, she said, was misunderstood and would yet prove himself a great leader. When I met her, she was busy grooming Albert Hourani, a brilliant young Syrian who later testifed before us, to succeed her husband as an Arab spokesman. Hourani had been born in Manchester, England, and educated at Oxford, where, by an interesting coincidence, he had once been a student of Dick Crossman.
Page 174: Jaamal Husseini appeared first for the Arab case. He had listened carefully to what Dr. Weizmann and Ben Gurion had said, now silent, now whispering to Auni Bey beside him, now smiling, now shaking his head in dis- agreement. Now, as the two Arab leaders appeared before us, the room was more heavily guarded than usual. The press was put through an even more rigid search for bombs and weapons. We knew something of these two men-two of the principal Arab leaders in the Middle East. From in- formation furnished us, we knew that both were repre- sentatives of the self-designated Arab Higher Committee. Neither possessed authority from the masses of the Pales- tine Arabs, and, as it was pointed out later, the young Arab intellectuals I had met at the King David were co1l- spicuously absent. Because of my prior knowledge of the Mufti's activities in Germany, I was, of course, particularly interested in meeting his nephew. Jaamal had been in open rebellion 1against the British authorities during the war. At one time he had a price on his head.
Making it clear that he recognized neither the Balfour Declaration nor the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine by which Great Britain became trustee for Palestine, ]aamal declared that we had no right to arbitrate or decide any questions "relating to the Arabs' natural rights in their own country." These rights could not be argued, he said. "Moreover," he went on, "we find ourselves in this inquiry deprived of the presence of our first leader, the Grand Mufti, for whom we can accept no substitute."
I had not quite expected to see the Mufti's name injected so soon. When Hassan el Banna in Cairo publicly supported the Mufti, it was excused on the ground that el Banna was irresponsible. I was rather surprised that Jaamal and the Arab Higher Committee chose to stand publicly in support of one of Hitler's arch-collaborators.
He pictured the Arab world in contrast to bickering, heterogeneous Europe as a mighty expanse extending from the Atlas Mountains to the Nile, from the Nile to the Euphrates and the Tigris and the confines of Persia, and from the borders of Turkey to the Indian Ocean. "One nation, one people, who speak one single language, who have a historic background and who have one future, one aspiration, one aim in the world-such are the Arabs."
The British had made conflicting promises to both Arabs and Jews, he asserted, and the promises to the Arabs of Palestine had not been carried out. He cited four basic demands by the Arabs of Palestine: recognition of the right to complete independence; abandonment of t'he attempt to establish a Jewish National Home; abrogation of the British Mandate for Palestine; immediate ending of all Jewish immigration and of sales of land.
Sir John asked him:
"Is it your wish that the British forces and police should be withdrawn from Palestine forthwith?" Jaamal nodded.
"Have you considered what would happen the day following?" asked Sir John. "Quite clearly, bloodshed." Jaamal demurred. "I don't think so," he said. "If these pampered children, these spoilt children of the British government, the Zionists, know for once that they are no more to be pampered and spoilt, then we will be friends probably."
If, however, the British troops were withdrawn, and there were a war …, pursued Sir John.
"Well, let it be, I say," exclaimed Jaamal. "It has happened all over the world that people have solved their difficulties by their fists."
"So you want us away and you want the British Army and the British police away and to leave you and the Jews together?"
"That is the best policy," said Jaamal. "If they can do it.
Jaamal al-Husseini, like other Arab leaders, did not fight in the 1936-39 Uprising. He escaped to to Syria (1937) and then to Baghdad, Iraq (1939).
Jaamal al-Husseini, like other Arab leaders, did not fight in the 1948 war. Throughout 1947 and early 1948, he served as the Arab Higher Committee's spokesman at the United Nations in New York.
Actually, hardly any Palestinians fought in the 1948 war.
"Then you would not allow any more immigration?" asked Sir John.
Jaamal agreed.
"What would you do about those who are in already?" "Well, sir," said Jaamal, "supposing you withdrew just now, I suppose that at least thirty per cent of the Jews who have been brought into Palestine under the impression that they were going to build a Jewish state here will leave of their own free choice."
Page 219: One morning, after a very brief session, we were driven to a well-guarded building some distance from the YMCA. Here we were ushered ceremoniously into a hlgh-ceilinged room, where a slender, very British, very precese military figure waited for us. This was General J. C. D'Arcy, the General Officer Commanding Palestine. I cannot report our conversation verbatim, but the substance of General D'Arcy's evidence to us, without question the most authoritative military information we could obtain follows:
- Speaking purely from the military point of view, he could enforce a pro-Jewish solution without much difficulty.
- In enforcing such a solution, the Haganah could be most helpful.
- In the event of a pro-Arab solution, he would have to contend with a "highly efficient" military organization (the Haganah). He estimated the budget of this organization to reach four million dollars a year. He would require three army divisions and from four to six months to break the back of the opposition. Even then, some measure of underground resistance would persist.
- In enforcing a pro-Arab solution, Arab support, he was afraid, would be of no value.
We discussed with him what would happen if British troops were withdrawn from Palestine. "If you were to withdraw British troops, the Haganah would take over all of Palestine tomorrow," General D'Arcy replied flatly.
"But could the Haganah hold Palestine under such circumstances?" I asked.
"Certainly," he said. "They could hold it against the entire Arab world."
One of my British colleagues asked: ""Are you implying sir, that it is impossible for His Majesty's government to disarm the Haganah?"
General D'Arcy said: "You cannot disarm a whole people. I rather think the world will not stand for another mass murder of Jews."
Sir Frederick turned to me. "Suppose the British left and the Haganah took over. What would the United States do?" he asked rhetorically.
I shouldn't be surprised if the United States would recognize the Jewish provisional government the very next day."